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Introduction  
Issues in immigration law often exist at the complex and confusing 
intersection of the plenary power doctrine, constitutional law, 
administrative law, and immigration law itself. Courts and legal scholars 
have long struggled with difficult legal and theoretical problems in each of 
these individual areas alone. It is not surprising then that, when combined, 
these problems may become intractable. And when the case in which they 
are confronted involves the permanent removal of a noncitizen from the 
United States, perhaps a long-term lawful permanent resident (LPR) whose 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/1
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entire life and family are here, the consequences to their resolution are 
magnified to the extreme.1 
One area that highlights what occurs when these areas of law overlap in a 
single case involves waivers of inadmissibility under the former section 
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and under the current 
INA section 212(h).2 Both of these waivers are frequently used to waive 
criminal convictions for long-term LPRs so that such LPRs do not lose their 
status and may remain legally in the United States. By the language alone 
of these waivers, they apply only to noncitizens seeking admission into the 
United States or otherwise subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. Both 
212(c) and 212(h) waivers, however, have been the subject of extensive 
litigation seeking to extend their reach to allow them to waive grounds of 
deportability. The result of the intersection of constitutional, administrative, 
and immigration law in this litigation appears to be, to put it simply, a mess. 
The decisions are inconsistent, sometimes incoherent, and often irrational in 
terms of both outcome and doctrine. 
With respect to outcome, the courts have reached essentially the opposite 
result in 212(c) and 212(h) cases: 212(c) is available to most noncitizens 
seeking to waive charges of deportability while 212(h) is not. With respect 
to doctrine, despite immigration exceptionalism’s insistence that Congress’ 
power over immigration is plenary and that the executive branch is 
particularly deserving of deference in the immigration context, the courts 
have applied general principles of administrative and constitutional law to 
congressional and agency positions. Three major legal frameworks have 
been involved in these decisions: (1) judicial deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.;3 (2) arbitrary and capricious review of an agency’s 
action under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA);4 and (3) the guarantee of equal protection of the law under the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Not only have 
the courts considering these questions differed on how to interpret and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[D]eportation is a 
drastic measure . . . .”); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that 
deportation may result in not only loss of liberty but also “loss of both property and life; or 
of all that makes life worth living”). 
 2. The Immigration and Nationality Act, commonly referred to as the “INA,” begins at 
8 U.S.C. § 1101.  
 3. 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). 
 4. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
114 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:111 
 
 
apply particular portions of the legal standards, but they have also varied 
widely as to which of these particular legal standards they discuss and even 
whether they invoke any at all. 
Despite these radical discrepancies in outcome and legal framework, 
however, the 212(c) and 212(h) decisions can deepen our understanding of 
immigration exceptionalism, immigration law today, and immigration law’s 
intersection with administrative and constitutional law. The application of 
ordinary administrative and constitutional law principles in these cases 
demonstrates a clear continuing erosion of immigration exceptionalism and 
the plenary power doctrine. Furthermore, there are significant parallels in 
the courts’ analyses regardless of which of the three legal frameworks is 
employed. Assessing whether an agency’s legal interpretation is reasonable 
under step two of the Chevron analysis looks a great deal like analyzing 
whether an agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious under section 
706(2)(A) of the APA, which in turn looks a great deal like considering 
whether there is a rational basis for a particular action under minimal 
scrutiny equal protection review. 
The courts themselves have only recently and rarely begun to note these 
parallels and have never analyzed their significance. This failure is one 
facet of a larger issue: the courts in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases have 
primarily engaged in only a surface application of the constitutional and 
administrative law principles discussed. I argue that this failure illustrates 
the continuing effects of plenary power and immigration law 
exceptionalism. Deeper attempts to explore what these doctrines mean, 
address the many remaining questions regarding their application in the 
immigration law context, and consider how the individual doctrines 
interconnect will be the next step in the erosion of immigration 
exceptionalism. Like the weakening of the plenary power doctrine thus far, 
however, progress is likely to be slow, incremental, and non-linear. 
Part I of this article will introduce the doctrinal frameworks: the plenary 
power doctrine and the theory of immigration exceptionalism, Chevron 
deference, arbitrary and capricious review, and equal protection rational 
basis analysis. Part II will detail the development of the problem in the case 
law regarding the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h) waivers to grounds of 
deportability. Part III then contains the heart of the argument. I will argue 
that the differences in outcome and application of doctrine between the 
212(c) and 212(h) cases and even among each case type are irreconcilable. 
Despite these irreconcilable differences, however, there are substantial 
parallels in the factors the courts are actually considering in these cases. As 
courts begin to acknowledge and explore these parallels and engage in a 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/1
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deeper analysis of the administrative and constitutional principles being 
employed, the validity and hold of a theory of immigration exceptionalism 
will continue to decline.  
I. Doctrinal Frameworks  
Immigration law is in many respects “special”: it is complicated, 
intricate, and highly technical under the best of circumstances.5 
Immigration law has also been understood to differ markedly from other 
areas of the law, in particular with respect to questions of judicial review 
and constitutionality.6 Ordinary legal principles are not expected to apply in 
the same way they might in other contexts, and outcomes that would be 
unusual in other settings are not uncommon. This understanding is 
sometimes described as a theory of “immigration exceptionalism.”7 At its 
core, immigration exceptionalism stems from the development of the 
plenary power doctrine in a series of Supreme Court decisions from the late 
1800s.8 The plenary power doctrine means in effect that Congress has 
absolute and unqualified power, immune from the threat of judicial review, 
over choices regarding which noncitizens to admit into and deport from the 
United States.9 Courts allow constitutional violations against noncitizens in 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (“Those 
hardy readers who have made it this far will surely agree with the ‘complexity’ point.”); cf. 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the 
Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925 (1995) (“For more than a hundred years, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has been telling us that immigration law is just plain 
different.” (footnotes omitted)); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1299, 1301 (2011) (“What emerges from this discussion is the realization that 
deportation does not fit neatly into the civil or criminal box, but rather that it lives in the 
netherworld in between.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era 
of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 58 (2015) (“Immigration law 
is most well-known among law professors for its marked departure from mainstream U.S. 
constitutional law.”); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 925-26; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory 
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-60 (1990). 
 7. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 59; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration 
Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
307, 307 (2000); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999). 
 8. See Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-15 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu 
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese 
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
 9. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 58-59. 
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the immigration context that would be impermissible in other areas of 
law.10 
Immigration exceptionalism also extends beyond the plenary power 
doctrine. Hiroshi Motomura, for example, has defined it as “the view that 
immigration and alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on 
government decisionmaking . . . .”11 Immigration and alienage law includes 
all immigration or status-related matters affecting noncitizens in the United 
States, not just laws relating to the entry and expulsion of noncitizens.12 
The plenary power doctrine focuses primarily on the relationship between 
the courts and Congress—that is, between the judicial and the legislative 
branches of government. Immigration exceptionalism is also concerned 
with relationships between the courts and the immigration executive 
agencies (the judicial and the executive branches), between Congress and 
the immigration executive agencies (the legislative and executive 
branches), and between federal law and state law.13  
Immigration exceptionalism and the individual constitutional rights of 
noncitizens have long existed in awkward tension with each other. Another 
particularly significant aspect of immigration law exceptionalism today is 
its intersection with doctrines of deference in administrative law.14 A strong 
application of the theory of immigration exceptionalism would suggest that 
these constitutional and administrative “usual limits on government 
decisionmaking” should have no role in immigration cases.15 
Noncitizens and commentators alike have long criticized the plenary 
power doctrine and debated the exact degree of deference to congressional 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See, e.g., id.; cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its 
broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would 
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”). 
 11. Motomura, supra note 7, at 1363. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 1361. Commentators have even argued for further expansion of the 
subject matter covered by a theory of immigration exceptionalism. See, e.g., Rachel E. 
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
1965, 1969 (2013) (arguing for a “broader understanding of immigration exceptionalism” 
that focuses on the system’s procedural aspects and takes into consideration its implications 
for both noncitizens and citizens). 
 13. Cf. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1671, 1672-76 (2007) (focusing on the distribution of authority between Congress and the 
executive agencies and the judiciary’s role in influencing that distribution). 
 14. Cf. id. at 1671 (discussing the intersection of the plenary power doctrine and 
administrative law doctrines of deference). 
 15. Motomura, supra note 7, at 1363. 
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judgment it requires.16 Although the demise of the plenary power doctrine 
has been incorrectly predicted for decades,17 the doctrine certainly is less 
robust today than initially understood or intended.18 In recent years, as 
courts have increasingly begun to apply ordinary principles of law in an 
ordinary manner in immigration cases, scholars have not only recognized 
the erosion of the plenary power doctrine but also questioned the continued 
viability of a theory of immigration exceptionalism.19 This trend is apparent 
in the extensive case law in the context of 212(c) and 212(h) waivers.  
Three “ordinary” principles of law have played a particular role in these 
cases. Under the umbrella of administrative law, courts have invoked both 
Chevron deference and arbitrary and capricious review under the APA. In 
the constitutional law arena, courts have engaged in equal protection 
review. This section will briefly introduce all three principles. Each of these 
doctrines alone are, of course, complex and the subject of countless cases 
and voluminous scholarship. This section is not intended to be a 
comprehensive survey, but rather a simple introduction to the facets of the 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 5, at 925-26; Motomura, supra note 7, at 1363-64; 
Motomura, supra note 6, at 550-62; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002). 
 17. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology 
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 287 (2000); Johnson, supra note 6, at 59-60; Michael Kagan, Plenary 
Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27-29 
(2015) (“A sober observer would point out that immigration law scholars have been 
predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power doctrine for at least three decades.”); 
Legomsky, supra note 5, at 936-37; Spiro, supra note 16, at 339-40. 
 18. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 220-22 (6th ed. 2015); Johnson, supra note 6, at 59-60, 60 n.7; 
Legomsky, supra note 5, at 930-37; Motomura, supra note 7, at 1372-73; Motomura, supra 
note 6, at 607-13; Rosenbloom, supra note 12, at 1983, 1983 n.129 (“A number of scholars 
have chronicled the emergence of cracks in the plenary power doctrine over the decades.”); 
Spiro, supra note 16, at 341-45; cf. Chin, supra note 17, at 258 (“At the time they were 
decided, many of the terrible immigration cases could have come out the same way even if 
they involved the rights of citizens under domestic constitutional law. It is not that any of the 
cases were correctly decided, rather, it is that they could have been decided the same way 
without resort to any claim that they were beyond the Constitution.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 58-66; Kagan, supra note 17, at 21-23; cf. T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. 
COMMENT. 9, 34 (1990) (calling for an end to immigration exceptionalism more than fifteen 
years ago). But cf. Motomura, supra note 7, at 1393 (“The question of immigration 
exceptionalism is considerably more nuanced. Immigration can be exceptional for some 
purposes and not for others.”). 
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principles and open questions that figure prominently in the case law on 
212(c) and 212(h) discussed in Part II below. 
A. Administrative Law 
1. Chevron Deference 
The Supreme Court in Chevron held that courts must defer to a 
reasonable agency interpretation of the statute that agency is charged to 
administer.20 Prior to the Court’s decision in Chevron, judicial deference to 
agency interpretations had been approached on a more ad hoc basis, with 
multiple contradictory approaches existing in the case law.21 While at the 
time the decision was issued Chevron was not viewed as a watershed,22 it 
quickly became a profoundly significant decision in administrative law.23  
                                                                                                                 
 20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
 21. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 13, at 1682 (“In fact, that was part of the point of 
Chevron—to create a general, trans-substantive doctrine of administrative deference to 
replace the more ad hoc approach to deference that had previously characterized 
administrative law jurisprudence.”); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of 
Nothing At All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2013) (“We 
do not believe any single principle can either account for all pre-Chevron Supreme Court 
decisions or—more to the point for this study—describe the views of all pre-Chevron lower 
courts about the law prescribed by pre-Chevron Supreme Court decisions, but we do think 
that such decisions and views converge on the key inquiry, implicit in Judge Friendly's 
description in Pittston Stevedoring: whether the legal question decided by the agency and 
under judicial review is a pure question of legal interpretation or a mixed question of law 
application to a particular set of facts.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 29-33 (“[W]hen Chevron was briefed 
and argued in the Supreme Court, no one thought it was a case involving any serious, 
general question about the standard of review for questions of law.”); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 975-76 (1992); Antonin 
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
512 (“It should not be thought that the Chevron doctrine—except in the clarity and the 
seemingly categorical nature of its expression—is entirely new law.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 2 (“Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., for which the doctrine is named, has become the most cited 
case in federal administrative law, and indeed in any legal field, and the scholarship on 
Chevron could fill a small library.” (footnotes omitted)); Scalia, supra note 22, at 512 
("Chevron has proven a highly important decision—perhaps the most important in the field 
of administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC. In the first 
three and a half years after its announcement—up to the beginning of 1988—Chevron was 
cited by lower federal courts over 600 times.” (footnote omitted)). 
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The federal courts typically apply Chevron deference as a two-step test.24 
At step one, courts must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”25 If, on the other hand, 
“the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the 
courts move on to step two, where “the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”26 
Within three years, the Supreme Court applied Chevron in an immigration 
case.27 The Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca held that Congress had 
spoken clearly in defining refugees as those who have a “well-founded fear 
of persecution” and that deference to the agency’s interpretation of that 
language was therefore unwarranted.28 
The application of Chevron has not been nearly as straightforward as this 
simple two-step test might suggest, however. Substantial questions left 
unanswered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron remain at all 
stages of the Chevron inquiry.29 Each of these questions has arisen at times 
in the immigration context. First, when, or to what type of agency 
interpretations, does Chevron apply in the first instance? Scholars often call 
this the “Chevron step zero” inquiry.30 Second, how clearly must Congress 
have spoken in the statute at issue? Asked otherwise, how should courts 
determine Congress’ intent? What role do canons of statutory construction 
play?31 Finally, when is an agency’s interpretation reasonable or 
permissible? How deeply should the courts scrutinize agency action and 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 59-60; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated 
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of 
Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 83-84, 83 n.4 (1994). Even this basic structure, however, is a 
matter of some debate. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of 
Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 
144, 144 n.10 (2012); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One 
Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597-99 (2009). 
 25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 26. Id. at 843. 
 27. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987). 
 28. Id. at 427-28, 446-50. 
 29. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 2-3. 
 30. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 
76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 
187, 191 (2006). 
 31. See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 
17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 517 (2003) (“One important issue left unresolved by the Court is 
the role of canons of construction in the review of agency interpretations.”). 
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conclusions at this stage of the inquiry?32 Underlying all of these 
unresolved issues is the question of what exactly deference means in the 
first place, and therefore, what courts should be doing in applying the 
Chevron two-step test.33  
2. Arbitrary and Capricious Review  
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that a reviewing court must 
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found 
to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law . . . .”34 Review under this section of the APA is 
commonly referred to as “arbitrary and capricious review.”35 How courts 
should approach arbitrary and capricious review has evolved over time36 
and even today differs depending on the type of agency action being 
reviewed.37 Prior to the 1960s and 1970s, arbitrary and capricious review 
strongly resembled the highly deferential rational basis test then used in 
constitutional due process analysis.38 Thereafter, courts began to engage in 
more searching review under the same umbrella standard.39 The Supreme 
Court officially rejected any comparison with rational basis review in favor 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Cf. Cox, supra note 13, at 1679, 1679 n.25 (taking the position on the opinions of 
Posner and other judges strongly criticizing decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
“that one cannot fit this apparent lack of deference into standard administrative law 
doctrines”). 
 33. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1093 (2008); Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 9-10 (“[T]he word 
'deference' is used in many different senses, and its usage is not always consistent even 
within individual opinions. . . . Deference can mean anything from complete entrustment of 
decisionmaking authority to another—essentially the absence of review—to a simple 
acknowledgment that someone else has an opinion on the subject.” (footnote omitted)).  
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 35. Cf. Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C.L. 
REV. 721, 727 (2014) (“Arbitrary and capricious review is rooted in the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”). 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 727-33; Heath A. Brooks, Case Comment: American Trucking 
Associations v. EPA: The D.C. Circuit’s Missed Opportunity to Unambiguously Discard the 
Hard Look Doctrine, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 268-69 (2003). 
 37. See, e.g., Virelli, supra note 35, at 724. 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 727; Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69. 
 39. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-417 (1971), is 
commonly cited as the impetus for this development. See also, e.g., Virelli, supra note 35, at 
727-733; Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69. 
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of a less deferential standard in 1983 in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.40 
Today, arbitrary and capricious review is also known as the “hard look 
doctrine.”41 As applied today, the doctrine requires courts to ensure that 
agencies have engaged in reasoned decision-making by looking at both 
procedural and substantive factors such as whether the agency considered 
all relevant factors, “the existence and quality of the administrative record 
supporting the agency’s decision, the presence and persuasiveness of the 
agency’s explanation for that decision, and the ‘rational connection’ 
between the agency’s explanation and its ultimate policy position.”42 
Typically, courts use arbitrary and capricious review to review an agency’s 
policy determinations. However, the line between a legal interpretation that 
would trigger Chevron deference and a policy determination that would 
trigger arbitrary and capricious review is, at best, fuzzy and, at worst, non-
existent.43  
B. Constitutional Law: Equal Protection 
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits the federal government from depriving any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This means 
essentially that the federal government must treat similarly situated people 
                                                                                                                 
 40. 463 U.S. 29, 42-43, 43 n.9 (1983) (“The Department of Transportation suggests that 
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a 
statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause. We do not 
view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by 
Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory 
mandate.”). But cf. Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69, 269 n.99 (“Although courts continue to 
use phrases like ′rational basis′ and ′reasoned decision-making′ when performing arbitrary 
and capricious review, the actual test being applied is not nearly as deferential as the 
constitutional rational basis test.” (citations omitted)). 
 41. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 12-13 (“As the law has developed over 
the past half-century, agency policy decisions—or at least policy decisions of threshold 
consequence—are reviewed under the so-called 'hard look doctrine,' which requires agencies 
to articulate the reasons behind their actions and requires courts to ensure agencies have 
seriously considered both the problems before them and their relevant factors.”). 
 42. Virelli, supra note 35, at 727-29 (footnotes omitted). 
 43. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 13 (“Unfortunately, the line between 
agency policymaking and agency law-finding is anything but sharp, especially in a world 
from which the nondelegation doctrine has been largely expunged.”); cf. Claire R. Kelly, 
The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron’s Second Step as Well as Other 
Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 177-83 (2010). 
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alike.44 Purposeful distinctions among similarly situated individuals will be 
reviewed according to one of the three levels of scrutiny, strict, 
intermediate, or rational basis, depending on the protected class to which 
the individuals belong. Under strict scrutiny, a distinction must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.45 Under rational basis 
review—also known as minimal scrutiny—a distinction need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.46 
For a number of reasons, distinctions involving noncitizens have been 
notoriously difficult to classify. First, distinctions based on citizenship 
likely also involve at least one other factor, such as sex, race, or nationality. 
Second, the applicable standard of scrutiny depends on who is conducting 
the discrimination. State classifications that discriminate on the basis of 
alienage are subject to strict scrutiny because noncitizens have been held to 
be a “suspect class” deserving of heightened judicial protection.47 Federal 
classifications related to alienage, however, receive only rational basis 
review as a result of the plenary power doctrine and immigration 
exceptionalism discussed in Section I.A.48 
II. Development of the Problem: 212(c) and 212(h) Waivers 
Section 212(c) and 212(h) waivers have a seemingly simple function: to 
“forgive” violations of the immigration laws so that a noncitizen can get or 
retain legal status in the United States. Despite this apparent simplicity, 
legal eligibility for the two waivers has been the subject of extensive 
litigation. One particularly important question has been the expansion of the 
two waivers to grounds of deportability as well as inadmissibility. Section 
II.A will lay the groundwork for a discussion of the application of 
“ordinary” administrative and constitutional principles in this body of case 
law. It will introduce the place of these two waivers within the overall 
structure of immigration law as well as the basic legal requirements for 
each waiver. The remaining Sections, II.B through II.D, will trace the 
history of the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h), paying particular attention to 
the courts’ invocation and application of Chevron deference, arbitrary and 
capricious review, and rational basis equal protection review. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 44. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 45. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 46. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 47. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 48. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1976). 
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A. Introduction to 212(c) and 212(h) Waivers 
The current procedural structure of immigration law in the United States 
is largely a product of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).49 Under this current system, 
noncitizens may have difficulty obtaining or keeping legal status because of 
problems with inadmissibility under section 212 of the INA or with 
deportability under INA section 237. The deportability provisions of INA 
section 237(a) apply to noncitizens who have already been legally inspected 
and admitted into the United States.50 The inadmissibility provisions of 
INA section 212(a) apply under certain specified circumstances: LPRs 
seeking admission who have particular types of criminal convictions or 
meet other narrowly defined exceptions; all other noncitizens seeking 
admission into the United States; noncitizens inside the United States who 
were paroled in, entered as crewmen, or entered without inspection; and 
noncitizens inside the United States who are applying for adjustment of 
status or other immigration benefits that specify admissibility as an element 
of the relief sought.51 Questions of inadmissibility and deportability are 
typically decided in a single set of proceedings, called removal 
proceedings.52  
The structure of immigration law prior to 1996 had one particularly 
significant parallel to the post-IIRIRA system: the concepts of excludability 
and deportability, which mirror the current inadmissibility and deportability 
sections of the INA.53 Noncitizens seeking entry or admission into the 
United States have consistently been treated differently than those who are 
already here.54 Before 1996, however, excludability and deportability were 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (making substantial changes to both 
the substance and procedure of U.S. immigration law). 
 50. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (applying to “[a]ny alien . . . in and 
admitted to the United States"); INA § 101(a)(13)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(a) (2012) 
(defining “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection 
and authorization by an immigration officer”). 
 51. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (rendering noncitizens within the specified 
grounds of inadmissibility “ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the 
United States”); INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2012). 
 52. See INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2012). 
 53. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-46 (2011). 
 54. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also, e.g., 
Rosenbloom, supra note 12, 1983-84; Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention 
of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 
936-38, 948 (1995).  
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decided in two separate types of proceedings, and those who were subject 
to each type were defined differently than is the case today.55 Both before 
and after 1996, the grounds of excludability/inadmissibility and 
deportability have changed and expanded over time.56 
Section 212 of the INA—both before and after IIRIRA’s 1996 
revisions—also contains waivers in addition to specifying grounds of 
inadmissibility. These waivers allow certain grounds of inadmissibility to 
be “forgiven” under specified circumstances so that noncitizen applicants 
may enter the United States or obtain a legal status that they would be 
otherwise eligible for but for the ground of inadmissibility being waived. 
Among these waivers are those under the former INA section 212(c) and 
the current INA section 212(h). Sections 212(c) and 212(h) are both 
frequently used to waive criminal convictions for long-term LPRs so that 
such LPRs do not lose their status and may remain legally in the United 
States. Section 212(c) may be used to waive most types of criminal 
convictions,57 while the scope of 212(h) is more limited. Section 212(h) 
covers only inadmissibility resulting from crimes involving moral turpitude, 
multiple criminal convictions, prostitution and commercialized vice, and 
possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana.58 
1. INA Section 212(c)  
Congress enacted section 212(c) of the INA in 1952 to replace a similar 
waiver known as the Seventh Proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of 
1917.59 In order to qualify for relief under section 212(c), a noncitizen must 
be lawfully admitted for permanent residence and have maintained a lawful 
domicile in the United States for the seven years immediately preceding the 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45-46. 
 56. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 94-96 (2nd Cir. 2007); see also 1 CHARLES 
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.04 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 
2016). 
 57. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (amended 1996); 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, 
§ 74.04(1)(a). 
 58. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (“The Attorney General may, in his 
discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection 
(a)(2) of this section and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a 
single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana . . . .”); see also INA § 
212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2012). 
 59. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 
163, 187 (1952) (originally passed as the McCarran-Walter Bill of 1952); Pub. L. No. 64-
301, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (1917); 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(1)(a). 
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application for relief.60 Certain grounds of inadmissibility related to 
national security and international child abduction will make a noncitizen 
ineligible.61  
After demonstrating basic eligibility, the noncitizen must demonstrate 
that the positive discretionary factors present in his or her individual case 
outweigh the negative in order to show that he or she merits relief in an 
exercise of the immigration judge’s discretion.62 Positive factors that an 
immigration judge should consider include 
family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in 
this country (particularly when the inception of residence 
occurred while the respondent was of young age), evidence of 
hardship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs, 
service in the country’s Armed Forces, a history of employment, 
the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and 
service to the community, proof of a genuine rehabilitation if a 
criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to a 
respondent’s good character.63  
Potentially adverse factors, on the other hand, are  
the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground 
at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this 
country’s immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record 
and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness, and the presence 
of other evidence indicative of a respondent’s bad character or 
undesirability as a permanent resident of this country.64  
The adjudicator must explicitly weigh these factors in his or her decision 
granting or denying relief.65 
Section 212(c) remained a part of the INA from its enactment in 1952 
until IIRIRA repealed it, effective April 1, 1997.66 Despite the fact that 
212(c) is not part of the current statute, the question of eligibility for 
waivers under the former section 212(c) remains far from a moot point. The 
                                                                                                                 
 60. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (amended 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f) (2016). 
 61. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (amended 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(3) (2016). 
 62. Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582-83, 584 (BIA 1978). 
 63. Id. at 584-85. 
 64. Id. at 584. 
 65. Id. at 585. 
 66. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996) (replacing 212(c) by cancellation of 
removal under INA section 240A(a)). 
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Supreme Court held in INS v. St. Cyr that applying the repeal of 212(c) to 
criminal issues that pre-dated IIRIRA could have an impermissibly 
retroactive effect.67 That is, 212(c) waivers must remain available to certain 
noncitizens who would have been eligible for them at the time of the 
criminal issues that rendered them removable.68 The exact meaning and 
application of the holding in St. Cyr was challenged repeatedly before the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“the Board” or “BIA”) and the circuit 
courts of appeals, but the totality of this history is not relevant here.69 To 
summarize, the current result of this litigation is that 212(c) can be used 
today to waive all convictions occurring prior to April 1, 1997, if the 
noncitizen meets the requirements of 212(c) as amended at the time of the 
plea or conviction.70 
2. INA Section 212(h) 
Section 212(h) of the INA was first created in 1957.71 The current 
version of the waiver was not enacted until 1996, as part of the same statute 
that repealed the former INA 212(c).72 There are three different categories 
of noncitizens who qualify for relief under the current version of section 
212(h): (1) noncitizens whose criminal convictions occurred more than 
fifteen years before their application for admission, are rehabilitated, and 
                                                                                                                 
 67. 533 U.S. 289, 314-326 (2001). 
 68. Id. at 326. 
 69. See Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6-15 (2013), for more discussion of this history. 
 70. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(4) (2016) (stating 212(c) waives all aggravated felony 
convictions prior to November 29, 1990, but conviction for an aggravated felony or 
aggravated felonies between November 29, 1990, and April 24, 1996, will bar relief if the 
noncitizen served an aggregate term of imprisonment of five years or more for those 
convictions); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(h) (2016) (explaining the impact of amendments made to 
212(c) in 1996); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297 (explaining the impact of amendments made to 
212(c) in 1990 and 1996); Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 268-69 (BIA 2014) 
(clarifying that 212(c) is available to noncitizens convicted after trial as well as through plea 
agreement). For an illustration of the complexity of determining whether a noncitizen 
qualified for 212(c) at the time of her conviction, see Maria Baldini-Potermin, CHART: 
Eligibility for a 212(c) Waiver After Judulang and St. Cyr, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT, 
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/cd_pa_Chart_
on_212c_After_Judulang.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).  
 71. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85–316, § 5, 71 Stat. 639, 640 (codified at INA § 
212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012)). 
 72. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 348, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 (1996); see 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, 
§ 63.03(11)(f)(i). 
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pose no danger to the national welfare, safety, and security of the United 
States; (2) noncitizens who can demonstrate extreme hardship to a spouse, 
parent, son or daughter that is an LPR or a United States citizen; or (3) self-
petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act.73 A noncitizen 
admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident is barred from 
relief under all three categories if he or she has a conviction for an 
aggravated felony or has not lawfully resided in the United States for seven 
years prior to the initiation of removal proceedings.74  
Like 212(c), a 212(h) waiver is ultimately discretionary.75 The 
adjudicator must balance the same positive and adverse factors previously 
discussed to decide whether an eligible noncitizen merits an exercise of 
relief in the court’s discretion.76 For applicants under the second subsection 
discussed above who must demonstrate extreme hardship to a qualifying 
relative, there is a substantial similarity in the factors to be considered for 
hardship and for discretion, and in practice these two distinct portions of the 
required analysis are often collapsed together.77 
3. Expansion 
These basics of statutory eligibility are only the beginning of the story 
for both 212(c) and 212(h).78 By the language alone of these waivers, they 
apply only to noncitizens seeking admission into the United States or 
otherwise subject to the grounds of inadmissibility as set forth in Section 
II.A. Both 212(c) and 212(h) waivers, however, have been the subject of 
extensive litigation seeking to extend their reach. One focus of these 
challenges has been to extend the applicability of the waivers to the 
criminal grounds of deportability in addition to those of inadmissibility.  
                                                                                                                 
 73. INA § 212(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1) (2012). 
 74. INA § 212(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2) (2012). 
 75. Matter of Mendez-Morales, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 299-300 (BIA 1996). 
 76. Id. at 299-300 (citing Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978)). 
 77. See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560, 565–66 (BIA 1999); 5 
GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 63.12(2)(a)(iii)(B), (iv); Gerald P. Seipp, Waivers of 
Inadmissibility–From Basic Principles to Advanced Practice Considerations (Part 2), 03-09 
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, at text accompanying note 27 (West 2003). 
 78. Today neither 212(c) nor 212(h) can be understood without reference to the wide-
ranging and sometimes conflicting case law that has interpreted and expanded the statutory 
provisions. Section 212(c), in particular, has been described as “one of the most complex 
and frequently litigated areas of immigration law.” 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, 
§ 74.04(2)(a). This article does not (and could not) encompass the entirety of that judicial 
history, but instead focuses on the particular aspect of it identified in this paragraph: the 
availability of the waivers when a noncitizen is charged as deportable rather than 
inadmissible. 
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The results of this litigation can be summarized, in a somewhat 
oversimplified sense, as follows: 212(c) can be used as a stand-alone waiver 
to waive both inadmissibility and deportability while 212(h) as a stand-
alone waiver will waive only grounds of inadmissibility. To demonstrate 
how the courts could have reached such radically divergent outcomes in 
seemingly substantially similar situations, the remaining sections in this 
part will trace the development of the case law in each of the two different 
areas. Sections II.B and II.C will focus on 212(c); Section II.B will cover 
the initial application of 212(c) to the context of deportability; and Section 
II.C will answer the question of which grounds of deportability 212(c) can 
waive. Section II.D will address the significantly shorter history of the 
failed expansion of 212(h). Throughout, I will focus in particular on the 
invocation of ordinary administrative and constitutional law doctrines and 
on the rationale used by the various courts within these frameworks to reach 
such different conclusions. 
B. Expansion of 212(c) Waivers to Deportability: The Basics 
Questions of the applicability of and eligibility for relief under 212(c) 
were actively contested and litigated over the forty-plus years that the 
section was part of the INA.79 The uncertainties and legal challenges have 
only multiplied during the fifteen-plus years since its repeal.80 As covered 
here in Section II.B, the basic issue of the expanded applicability of 212(c) 
to charges of deportability was effectively resolved long before the repeal 
of the subsection.81 As will be discussed in Section II.C, however, related 
questions continue to be litigated even today. Most recently and 
significantly, these cases have been related to the Supreme Court’s 
consideration in Judulang v. Holder of the standard for determining exactly 
which offenses or grounds of deportability may be waived for noncitizens 
charged as deportable.82 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-47 (2011); Glen, supra note 69, at 7-12; 7 
GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(2). 
 80. For example, the issue of whether noncitizens convicted after a jury trial instead of 
by plea remain eligible for 212(c) waivers remained unresolved until the Supreme Court 
issued their opinion in Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012). See also Matter of 
Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 268-69 (BIA 2014). The question of which criminal 
convictions are waivable continued to be litigated up through the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Judulang, 565 U.S. 42. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(2)(f), (4). 
 81. See generally Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Silva, 16 I. & 
N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976). 
 82. 565 U.S. 42. 
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1. Slow Growth  
The BIA recognized the expanded applicability of the former INA 
section 212(c) gradually through a series of incremental decisions.83 First, 
the Board recognized the ability of noncitizens charged as deportable to 
apply for a 212(c) waiver of inadmissibility nunc pro tunc.84 This holding 
did not benefit all noncitizens in deportation proceedings but only a 
subgroup: noncitizens who took a temporary and voluntary trip abroad after 
the criminal conviction that rendered them inadmissible and deportable and 
who qualified for a 212(c) waiver at the time of their reentry into the United 
States from that trip.85 Nunc pro tunc means literally “now for then.”86 
These noncitizens were granted a 212(c) waiver of inadmissibility back to 
the time of their reentry, as though they had been apprehended and placed 
in exclusion proceedings at that time instead of being placed in deportation 
proceedings later. 
The Board’s decisions relied primarily on the fact that the Seventh 
Proviso, the previously discussed predecessor to 212(c), had been available 
under these circumstances.87 Since Congress was well aware of this fact 
and did not act to change it while intentionally modifying other aspects of 
212(c), the Board held that Congress must have intended for 212(c) to 
remain available nunc pro tunc in deportation proceedings.88 The Board’s 
discussion in the 212(c) cases did not go beyond this. The decisions do not 
reference any equal protection concerns or discuss equal protection 
explicitly in any way. The Attorney General’s earlier Seventh Proviso case 
that was cited in the 212(c) cases—while not overtly raising equal 
protection or administrative law—did examine factors that would likely 
arise in an equal protection analysis and use language sounding similar to 
arbitrary and capricious review.89 The Attorney General recognized that 
“[n]ot what the alien has done but the fact that he has taken a trip becomes 
the operative fact that renders him excludable or deportable,” although he 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 270-71; 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(1)(a). 
 84. Matter of F-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 537, 537-34 (BIA 1955); Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 
598, 599-600 (BIA 1954); Matter of S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 393-97 (BIA 1954); cf. Matter 
of G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956). 
 85. F-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 538-39; M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. at 599-600; S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 
393-97. 
 86. Nunc pro tunc, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (Lexis Nexis, ed. 2010). 
 87. S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 393-96.  
 88. Id. 
 89. See Matter of L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 5-6 (A.G. 1940). 
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did not explicitly label this fact problematic.90 He discussed the fact that not 
allowing nunc pro tunc waivers of inadmissibility would mean that the 
respondent was placed in a worse position by having been (erroneously) 
readmitted without issue and determined, 
I cannot conclude that Congress intended the immigration laws 
to operate in so capricious and whimsical a fashion. Granted that 
respondent’s departure in 1939 exposed him on return to the 
peril of a fresh judgment as to whether he should be permitted to 
reside in the United States, such judgment ought not to depend 
upon the technical form of the proceedings. No policy of 
Congress could possibly be served by such irrational result.91 
While not referencing the equal protection or constitutional framework, this 
mirrors an exercise of rational basis review. 
Another Seventh Proviso case, holding that noncitizens may apply for 
and receive an advance grant of the 212(c) waiver prior to departure, went a 
step further.92 The Board noted that “a contrary view would result in 
consequences both capricious and absurd” and held that a chance trip 
abroad could not be allowed to determine an alien’s substantive eligibility 
for relief and ability to remain in the United States.93 It is highly likely, 
given the explicit reliance on the Seventh Proviso cases, that these same 
concerns were underlying the Board’s decisions in the 212(c) nunc pro tunc 
cases, even though the Board did not explicitly discuss them there. 
Next, the Board extended the holding in the nunc pro tunc cases to allow 
some noncitizens in deportation proceedings who had not departed the 
United States subsequent to the criminal issue that made them inadmissible 
to apply for a 212(c) waiver. So long as the noncitizen filed the waiver 
application in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status, the 
Board found the waiver would be available to those who qualify.94 Here 
again the Board was focused on not treating differently groups of 
noncitizens who were, for all relevant intents and purposes, substantially 
similarly situated. 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 5. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Matter of A-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 459, 461-63 (BIA 1946). 
 93. Id. at 461. 
 94. Matter of Smith, 11 I. & N. Dec. 325, 327 (BIA 1965). 
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These decisions appeared to culminate with the Board’s decision in a 
1971 case, Matter of Arias-Uribe.95 Here, the Board halted the expansion of 
the applicability of 212(c) waivers in deportation proceedings, holding that 
they were available only in the two scenarios previously discussed: nunc 
pro tunc to a post-conviction trip abroad or in conjunction with an 
application to adjust status.96 Arias-Uribe had not departed the United 
States after his conviction for possession of heroin and did not qualify for 
adjustment of status, but he argued that Congress had tacitly approved an 
administrative practice of allowing noncitizens like himself to nevertheless 
use a 212(c) waiver to waive grounds of deportability.97  
The Board rejected this argument, relying almost exclusively on the 
language of the statute itself to reach its conclusion.98 Specifically, the 
Board focused on the change in language from the Seventh Proviso, which 
required that the noncitizen be “returning after a temporary absence,” to the 
language in section 212(c), which required that the noncitizen have 
“temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of 
deportation.”99 The Board then held that this shift in language indicated 
Congress’ intention to curb the advance use of 212(c) waivers in 
deportation proceedings by requiring (in most cases) an actual departure 
and return to the country.100 The Board did not discuss the implication of 
the distinction this holding drew between noncitizens who happened to 
travel outside the United States and those who did not, or reference equal 
protection or factors relevant to an equal protection analysis in any way. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding in 
a brief decision without substantial discussion, stating simply that allowing 
the use of 212(c) to waive grounds of deportability violated the clear 
language of the statute.101  
2. Francis, Silva, and Onward 
Matter of Arias-Uribe proved, however, to be only a temporary pause. 
The expansion of the availability of 212(c) to waive grounds of 
deportability was restarted by a case decided by the Second Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                                 
 95. 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (BIA 1971), aff’d Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 
1972). 
 96. Id. at 697-99. 
 97. Id. at 697. 
 98. Id. at 699-700. 
 99. Id. at 699-700, 699 n.2; see also Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 100. Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 699-700; see also Francis, 532 F.2d at 271. 
 101. Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 1972). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
132 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:111 
 
 
Appeals, Francis v. INS.102 In Francis, the Second Circuit agreed that the 
Board’s interpretation in Arias-Uribe was consistent with the statutory 
language of section 212(c).103 Francis argued, however, and the Second 
Circuit agreed, that this interpretation deprived him of the equal protection 
of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.104  
The Second Circuit began by affirming that, despite Congress’ and the 
Executive’s plenary power over immigration, the government must abide 
by the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections in the area of 
immigration, and that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws applies 
to noncitizens in deportation proceedings.105 The court applied the minimal 
scrutiny test, which it explained required that “distinctions between 
different classes of persons must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest 
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be 
treated alike.”106 Ultimately, the court held that the government had offered 
no rational basis to treat lawful permanent residents who had never 
temporarily departed the country after a criminal conviction less favorably 
than those who had. No reason was offered to explain why travel should be 
a crucial factor, but even if it were, logic and fairness could not support the 
Board’s interpretation prohibiting a noncitizen “whose ties with this 
country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry” from 
even applying for 212(c) relief while allowing applications from “an 
individual who may leave and return from time to time.”107 The court 
concluded by stating, “Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent 
resident aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and 
fortuitous factors, be treated in a like manner.”108 
Deference was not addressed in Francis. Francis109 was decided nearly a 
decade prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron110 and Cardoza-
                                                                                                                 
 102. 532 F.2d 268. 
 103. Id. at 271-72. 
 104. Id. at 272-73. 
 105. Id. at 272 (first citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); then citing Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); and then citing Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2nd Cir. 
1975)). 
 106. Id. (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 107. Id. at 273. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 532 F.2d 268. 
 110. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Fonseca.111 The Second Circuit in deciding Francis, therefore, did not go 
through a step-by-step analysis to determine whether Congress had spoken 
clearly and, if not, if the agency’s interpretation was reasonable. In fact, 
beyond agreeing that the Board’s interpretation in Arias-Uribe was 
consistent with the statutory language, the court in Francis did not raise 
deferring to the Board’s position in Arias-Uribe at all, in word or in 
action.112 
The Board subsequently adopted the Second Circuit’s position in Matter 
of Silva.113 After tracing the history of the expansion of 212(c) relief and its 
own prior inconsistent decision in Arias-Uribe, the Board wholeheartedly 
adopted the Second Circuit’s holding and rationale from Francis without 
offering any additional reasoning or analysis of its own.114 Since Silva, the 
basic premise that noncitizens charged with deportability may be eligible 
for 212(c) waivers has been widely applied and essentially uncontested 
throughout the United States.115 Questions of precisely how this expanded 
applicability would be determined and applied in individual cases moving 
forward, however, remained unresolved.  
C. Expansion of 212(c) Waivers to Deportability: Which Grounds?  
One significant and controversial question that remained following 
Francis and Silva was what it meant for lawful permanent residents to be 
“similarly situated” and therefore prima facie eligible for relief under 
212(c). That is, since the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability are 
not identical,116 exactly what grounds of deportability or what criminal 
convictions may be waived under 212(c)?117 This question arose primarily 
                                                                                                                 
 111. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 112. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 271-73. 
 113. 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976). 
 114. Id. at 29-30 (“In light of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal 
protection of the law, it is our position that no distinction shall be made between permanent 
resident aliens who temporarily proceed abroad and nondeparting permanent resident aliens. 
We further conclude that permanent resident aliens similarly situated shall be treated equally 
with respect to their applications for discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the Act.”). 
 115. See, e.g., De Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1993); Butros v. INS, 
990 F.2d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 1993); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949 (7th Cir. 
1993); Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d 105, 106 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993); Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 
631, 633 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 313 (1st Cir.1992); 
Vissian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325, 328 n.3 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 116. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-46 (2011). 
 117. See, e.g., Sara Fawk, Note, Immigration Law - Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief 
from Deportation: Is It the Ground or the Offense, the Dancer or the Dance?, 32 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 417 (2010); Michael M. Waits, Note, “In Like Circumstances but for 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
134 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:111 
 
 
in three different groups of cases. The first group involved charges of being 
present in the United States after entering without inspection118—that is, a 
charge of deportability that could not logically be a ground of 
inadmissibility. The second group involved noncitizens convicted of 
firearm-related offenses.119 The third group consisted of noncitizens 
convicted of aggravated felonies.120 Unlike the charges of deportability in 
the first group, Congress could have chosen to make firearm offenses and 
aggravated felonies grounds of excludability. Instead, Congress made them 
grounds of deportability but not inadmissibility. Some convictions that 
constitute aggravated felonies would also trigger one of the criminal 
grounds of inadmissibility, while most convictions that are firearm offenses 
would not.  
                                                                                                                 
Irrelevant and Fortuitous Factors”: The Availability of Section 212(c) Relief to Deportable 
Legal Permanent Residents, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 465 (2009). 
 118. See INA § 241(a)(1)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(ii) (amended and transferred 
1996) (making being present in the United States after having entered without inspection a 
ground of deportability). Today entry without inspection is a ground of inadmissibility, not a 
ground of deportability. See INA § 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012). This is a 
result of IIRIRA’s shift from a focus on physical entry to a requirement of lawful inspection 
and admission as the dividing line between exclusion/inadmissibilty and deportability. See 
INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13)(A)(2012); Kate Aschenbrenner, Beyond 
“Because I Said So”: Reconciling Civil Retroactivity Analysis in Immigration Cases with a 
Protective Lenity Principle, 32 REV. LITIG. 147, 169-70 (2013). 
 119. See INA § 237(a)(2)(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(c) (2012) (making certain firearm 
offenses a ground of deportability). 
 120. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felonies). There 
is no definitive answer as to what caused this marked shift in the grounds of deportability for 
which noncitizens sought relief under the former 212(c), but at least part of the answer likely 
stems from changes made to immigration law by IIRIRA in 1996. Aggravated felonies 
became a ground of deportability in 1988, but at that time there were very few of them. See 
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295-96 n.4 (2001). In 1996, IIRIRA radically expanded the 
definition of aggravated felonies and specifically stated that the expansion was retroactive. 
See id. This meant that post-1996 someone could be deportable as an aggravated felon for a 
criminal conviction that occurred prior to 1996, making it more likely for the question of the 
expanded applicability of 212(c) to charges of deportability for these convictions to arise. 
Furthermore, IIRIRA also created a new remedy for LPRs with criminal convictions: 
cancellation of removal, which barred those with aggravated felony convictions but was a 
more attractive option for relief from removal for those charged with other grounds of 
removability. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). After St. Cyr clarified the 
continued availability of 212(c) relief in 2001, then, increasing numbers of noncitizens with 
what now constituted aggravated felony convictions were potentially in need of 212(c) relief 
while decreasing numbers of noncitizens with other types of convictions needed to rely on 
212(c). 
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Section II.C.1 below will discuss how the BIA and the circuit courts of 
appeals answered the question of what it means for an LPR charged as 
deportable to be similarly situated prior to the repeal of section 212(c) in 
1996. These cases fall within group one, those charged with entry without 
inspection, and group two, those charged with firearms offenses. Section 
II.C.2 will consider how the question was answered after 2001, when the 
Supreme Court held that denying 212(c) relief for criminal convictions 
occurring prior to its repeal could be impermissibly retroactive.121 These 
cases fall within group three, noncitizens charged as deportable for 
aggravated felony convictions. The Supreme Court finally weighed in on 
this question in 2011 in Judulang v. Holder. Section II.C.3 will address the 
Judulang case and its aftermath and application. 
1. Pre-Repeal 
a) The Board 
Following its decision in Silva extending eligibility for 212(c) relief to 
LPRs charged as deportable, the Board quickly confronted the question of 
what it meant for such an LPR to be similarly situated. The Board held in a 
number of cases that “if a ground of deportation is also a ground of 
inadmissibility,” the ground of deportation is waivable under 212(c).122 
This standard became known as the comparable-grounds analysis.123 
However, what this term meant in application—and therefore what exactly 
212(c) could waive for a noncitizen charged as deportable—was not so 
quickly resolved. For example, must the grounds of deportation and 
inadmissibility have identical language or can they differ slightly? How 
much? Or what if there is no similar ground of inadmissibility with 
corresponding language, but the conduct or conviction charged would 
trigger another ground of inadmissibility? Matter of Hernandez-Casillas,124 
decided by the Attorney General in 1991, appears to be considered by the 
circuit courts of appeals as the agency’s authoritative position on this 
issue.125  
                                                                                                                 
 121. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314-26. 
 122. Matter of Salmon, 16 I. & N. Dec. 734, 737 (BIA 1978); see also, e.g., Matter of 
Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (BIA 1984); Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 
(BIA 1979). 
 123. See, e.g., Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 124. 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991) aff'd, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 125. See, e.g., De La Rosa v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 
2009); Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Abebe v. Gonzales 
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Joel Hernandez-Casillas was an LPR. He was apprehended and charged 
as deportable for entering without inspection following his entry into the 
United States by wading across the Rio Grande while assisting a group of 
undocumented individuals to enter for a fee.126 He attempted to apply for 
relief under INA 212(c) even though he was placed in deportation, not 
exclusion, proceedings, but the immigration judge denied his application.127 
The immigration judge held that 212(c) was unavailable to noncitizens 
charged as deportable for entering without inspection.128 
The Board first decided Matter of Hernandez-Casillas in 1990.129 The 
Board reversed the immigration judge, holding that “the same fundamental 
fairness/equal protection arguments made in Francis v. INS can and should 
be invoked to make section 212(c) relief available to aliens deportable 
under any ground of deportability.”130 The Board relied heavily on the fact 
that the current application of 212(c) had already departed significantly 
from the original statutory language and intentions and that traditional tools 
of statutory interpretation were of little utility.131 In that light, it found that 
its approach was the cleanest and simplest logical alternative and would 
have “the benefit of alleviating potential hardships to sometimes deserving 
aliens.”132 The Board backed away from its previous cases requiring a 
“comparable ground” of excludability and essentially interpreted the 
“similarly situated” language from Francis and Silva in its broadest 
possible sense.133 
Had the Board’s decision stood, it likely would have substantially ended 
litigation on this particular question. In 1991, however, the Attorney 
                                                                                                                 
(Abebe I), 493 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007); Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 
2007); Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2007); Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales, 
483 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 368-70 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2001); Rodriguez-Padron 
v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1457, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1994); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 
949 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 126. Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 263. 
 127. Id. at 263-64. 
 128. Id. at 264. 
 129. Id. at 262. 
 130. Id. at 266 (citation omitted) (excluding only grounds of deportability “where there is 
a comparable ground of exclusion which has been specifically excepted from section 
212(c),” relating to “subversives and war criminals”). 
 131. Id. at 265 (“In deciding to change our approach to section 212(c) waivers, we have 
considered that section 212(c) as currently applied bears little resemblance to the statute as 
written.”). 
 132. Id. at 268-69. 
 133. See id.  
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General certified the case to himself and reversed the Board.134 The 
Attorney General was very critical of the Board’s “unjustified expansion of 
discretionary relief under section 212(c).”135 He declined to reconsider the 
Board’s decision in Silva, but seemed to encourage the Board to do so in a 
future case.136 He found no equal protection violation137 and no other reason 
to depart further from the statutory text of 212(c) and therefore held that 
Hernandez-Casillas was ineligible for relief under 212(c).138  
The Attorney General’s decision returned to the principle that 212(c) was 
unavailable to noncitizens in deportation proceedings charged with a 
ground of deportability for which there was no comparable or analogous 
ground of inadmissibility.139 The fact that the Board had previously reached 
a similar, although narrower, conclusion in a case within the second group, 
involving a firearm offense, further supported this principle. In Matter of 
Granados, the Board held that the respondent was ineligible for relief under 
212(c) because his firearms offense did not come within the grounds of 
excludability waivable by 212(c): “Conviction for possession of a 
concealed sawed-off shotgun is not a specified section 212(a) ground of 
excludability, nor a crime involving moral turpitude that would render the 
respondent excludable under section 212(a)(9) of the Act.”140 The terms 
“analogous” and “comparable,” however, were never clearly defined and 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at 280-81. The Attorney General has the power to certify Board decisions to him 
or herself for decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2016). The Attorney General’s decision 
will then become the final agency determination in the case and binding precedent in future 
cases. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2016). 
 135. Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 289. 
 136. Id. at 286; see also, e.g., Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 896 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
 137. Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 287-89 (“Under no plausible understanding 
of equal protection principles must discretionary relief be made available in deportation 
cases where the ground for deportation could not be waived if asserted in an exclusion 
case—or, as here, could not be asserted at all in an exclusion case.”). 
 138. Id. at 293. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Attorney 
General’s decision without opinion. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
 139. See, e.g., De La Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 
2009); Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Vue v. Gonzales, 
496 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2007); Abebe I, 493 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007); Dalombo 
Fontes v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 368-
70 (5th Cir. 2007); Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2001); 
Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1457, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1994); Leal-Rodriguez v. 
INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949-50 (7th Cir. 1993); Matter of Brieva, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 771 (BIA 
2005); Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 2005). 
 140. 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (BIA 1979). 
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the BIA and federal courts continued to issue decisions debating their 
meaning and reaching different conclusions. 
b) The Circuit Courts 
The circuit courts of appeals also grappled with the same question of 
what grounds of deportability could be waived by 212(c). These cases were 
initially concentrated in the first two groups: charges of deportability for 
entering without inspection and for firearm offenses. While cases involving 
entry without inspection might seem to present a more straightforward 
question, as entry without inspection under the version of the statute then in 
effect could not logically be a ground of deportability, in practice this did 
not prove to be the case. The courts hearing these cases took a variety of 
approaches and reached results different in several respects from the 
Attorney General’s holding in Hernandez-Casillas. The firearm offense 
cases, on the other hand, primarily reached the same conclusion as the BIA 
in Granados, albeit by several varying routes.  
(1) Group One: Entry Without Inspection 
The circuits split in major cases addressing entry without inspection. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez v. INS sided 
with the Attorney General in Hernandez-Casillas, finding that 212(c) could 
not waive deportability for entry without inspection.141 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia v. INS held the 
opposite, finding that, for the sake of “coherence and consistency,” 212(c) 
relief must be available to noncitizens charged as deportable for entering 
without inspection.142 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
perhaps most interestingly, found 212(c) available to waive entry without 
inspection in some cases but not in others.143 In Marti-Xiques v. INS, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that entry without inspection could be waived by 
section 212(c) where the noncitizen was also charged with some other, 
more serious, ground of deportability arising out of the same incident that 
                                                                                                                 
 141. 990 F.2d 939, 950 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 142. 6 F.3d 891, 897 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
 143. Compare Marti-Xiques v. INS, 713 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on 
rehearing 724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th 
Cir. 1984) with Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). Despite the 
fact that Farquharson was decided after the repeal of 212(c) in 1996, it deals with an order 
to show cause issued by INS in 1986 and therefore pre-1996 procedures and law govern the 
case on the questions relevant here. See Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1319, 1320 n.3. 
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did have a comparable ground in the grounds of inadmissibility.144 In 
Farquharson v. United States Attorney General, without so much as even 
citing to Marti-Xiques, the Eleventh Circuit held that 212(c) was not 
available to waive entry without inspection even where the respondent was 
also charged with deportability for a controlled substance violation, an 
arguably more serious ground of deportability, arising out of the same 
incident.145  
In addition to reaching these different substantive results, the courts took 
varying routes to get there, particularly with respect to their invocation of 
Chevron deference and reliance on equal protection arguments. The 
Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez cited to Chevron and discussed Chevron 
deference at some length before reaching the same result as the BIA.146 
Most of the discussion regarding Chevron, however, took place in the 
context of another issue in Leal-Rodriguez: whether Leal-Rodriguez’s 
actions in fact constituted an entry and therefore made him removable as 
charged for entering without inspection.147 When it reached its discussion 
of whether or not 212(c) was available to waive a charge of entering 
without inspection, the court simply referred back to its earlier discussion 
and stated, “we must defer to the Attorney General’s interpretation if it is 
reasonable.”148 The court cited to both the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                 
 144. 713 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on rehearing, 724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 
1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984). On rehearing, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that Marti-Xiques had not met one of the requirements, seven years of lawful 
domicile, to obtain relief under 212(c). Marti-Xiques, 741 F.2d at 355. 
 145. 246 F.3d at 1325. The court in Farquharson may have felt itself not bound by the 
prior panel’s decision in Marti-Xiques because that panel decision was vacated and decided 
on other grounds. Given the similarity in circumstances, however, it is somewhat surprising 
that the Farquharson court did not at least briefly acknowledge Marti-Xiques, even if it did 
not go so far as to explain or justify why it was reaching a different result. This is 
particularly true where the BIA and at least two other circuit courts of appeals discussed and 
seemingly took very seriously the Eleventh Circuit’s initial panel decision in Marti-Xiques. 
See Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1993); Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 
1326-27 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II), 554 F.3d 1203 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam); Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 267-
69 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991) aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 
1993) (unpublished table decision). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit itself discussed the original 
panel decision in Marti-Xiques in a firearm offense case, discussed below. See Rodriguez-
Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1458 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 146. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 944-46, 950-52 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 147. Id. at 944-46. 
 148. Id. at 950. 
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Chevron149 and another Seventh Circuit decision150 following this 
statement.151  
Leal-Rodriguez argued that the Attorney General’s decision in 
Hernandez-Casillas was unreasonable for three different reasons: that the 
language of 212(c) itself supports the extension of its relief to all deportable 
aliens, that the 1990 amendments to the INA support this interpretation and 
demonstrate that Congress intended it, and that the position announced in 
Hernandez-Casillas violated his right to equal protection under the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.152 
After considering and dismissing each of these three arguments, the 
Seventh Circuit found the agency’s position as announced in Hernandez-
Casillas reasonable and upheld it, dismissing Leal-Rodriguez’s appeal.153 
A problem with this analysis is that it completely skips two questions: 
whether Chevron applies in the first instance and whether Congress spoke 
clearly on the issue in question. The prior Seventh Circuit decision cited154 
and the decision it cites155 both repeat this same error, considering only 
whether the agency’s position on two separate, unrelated legal questions 
was reasonable. Although the court in Leal-Rodriguez identified these two 
questions in its discussion of the legal standard, it ignored them in 
application.156 The Seventh Circuit may have assumed that, given the 
somewhat tortured history of administrative and judicial modification it had 
detailed, it was clear that Congress had not spoken clearly.157 It did not, 
however, state, much less explain, this presumption or its decision to apply 
Chevron in the first instance. 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia did 
not cite to or discuss Chevron, but did make an oblique reference to 
deference in its preliminary statement of the standard of review. After 
asserting that its review of questions of law was plenary, it qualified its 
declaration by adding, “In conducting that review, however, deference must 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 150. Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Chevron to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA in an asylum claim). 
 151. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 950-52 ("We therefore leave the Attorney General’s decision intact and hold 
that section 212(c) relief is not available to Leal.”). 
 154. Zalega, 916 F.2d at 1259. 
 155. Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)). 
 156. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950-52. 
 157. Id. at 948-50. 
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be accorded to the views of the Attorney General, who is charged with the 
administration of the INA and whose rulings with respect to questions of 
immigration law are controlling within the executive branch.”158 In support 
of this statement on deference, the Second Circuit cited two cases: the 
Seventh Circuit’s Leal-Rodriguez case and its application of Chevron just 
discussed, and a pre-Chevron Second Circuit case applying a standard that 
differs, at least slightly, from the Chevron two-step test.159  
Despite discussing the Attorney General’s decision in Hernandez-
Casillas at length, the Second Circuit did not explicitly raise deference in 
its decision—perhaps because it did not in fact defer to that decision.160 It 
did, however, state, “The ruling that we make today poses no challenge to 
the legislative and executive branches, or to the Attorney General’s special 
role within the executive branch with respect to legal interpretation of the 
immigration statutes.”161 The Second Circuit relied heavily on the fact that 
the application of 212(c) had been judicially modified so far from the 
original text that it did not make sense to ask what the statutory language 
meant or what Congress intended.162 The court noted that what it was really 
interpreting was its own prior constitutional decision in Francis, not a 
statute over which the Attorney General had “conceded expertise.”163 The 
Second Circuit may then have been holding, although they did not 
explicitly state, that Chevron was inapplicable by its own terms because this 
was not an instance of an agency interpreting a statute that it was charged to 
administer. 
The Eleventh Circuit decided Marti-Xiques164 prior to the BIA’s decision 
in Hernandez-Casillas and prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chevron, so there was no directly on-point BIA decision to defer to and 
deference was not at issue. In Farquharson, the Eleventh Circuit, like the 
Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia, referenced deference exclusively in its 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 893 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
 159. Id. at 893-94 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988); Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950; 
De los Santos v. INS, 690 F.2d 56, 59 (2nd Cir. 1982)). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) simply sets 
out the authority of the Attorney General. De los Santos describes the standard as follows: 
“[I]f INS’s interpretation is reasonable, in that it is consistent with the statutory language, 
legislative history, and purpose of the statute, we will not invalidate it.” 690 F.2d at 59. 
 160. Bedoya-Valencia, 6 F.3d at 895-96 (stating, regarding the Board’s decision in 
Hernandez-Casillas, “We view the matter differently.”). 
 161. Id. at 898. 
 162. Id. at 897-98. 
 163. Id. at 898. 
 164. 713 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on rehearing, 724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 
1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984).  
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preliminary statement of its standard of review. It stated: “In our review of 
the BIA’s decision, we review the BIA’s statutory interpretation de novo, 
but we defer to the BIA’s interpretation if it is reasonable.”165 In support of 
this statement, it cited only to another Eleventh Circuit case.166 That case in 
turn cited to a third Eleventh Circuit case without significant discussion of 
the standard.167 The third case finally cites to, discusses, and applies the 
Chevron test.168  
The statement quoted above from Farquharson is not a complete 
statement of the Chevron test, as it omitted the step-one analysis of whether 
Congress has spoken clearly. However, it may simply be reciting stock 
language rather than affirmatively misstating the standard. The third case 
that finally cited Chevron, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, recited 
this same stock phrase before correctly and completely expanding and 
discussing the Chevron two-step test.169 On the other hand, the Eleventh 
Circuit in Farquharson may have been repeating the Seventh Circuit’s 
errors in Leal-Rodriguez by proceeding from a presumption that Chevron 
does apply and step one has already been decided in the negative or 
completely avoiding these preliminary questions. 
Although the Eleventh Circuit discussed the Board’s decision in 
Hernandez-Casillas,170 noted the significant similarities with Farquharson’s 
situation,171 and ultimately decided the case in accordance with the 
agency’s position,172 it did not apply anything resembling the Chevron two-
step test or even mention deference again in its analysis. The court focused 
on answering the question whether denying noncitizens like Farquharson, 
charged as deportable for entering without inspection, the opportunity to 
apply for relief under 212(c) violated equal protection.173 It did note that it 
found convincing the Attorney General’s analysis on this issue.174 
All three of the circuits in the cases considering entry without inspection 
at least referenced equal protection, but none found an equal protection 
violation. The Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia discussed equal 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 166. Id. (citing Asencio v. INS, 37 F.3d 614, 616 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 167. Asencio, 37 F.3d at 616 (citing Perlera-Escobar v. Exec. Office for Immigration, 894 
F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
 168. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1296-97. 
 169. See id. at 1296. 
 170. Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1323-24. 
 171. Id. at 1324-25. 
 172. Id. at 1325-26. 
 173. Id. at 1325.  
 174. Id. 
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protection only in the context of describing its prior decision in Francis and 
the Attorney General’s decision in Hernandez-Casillas, despite the fact that 
the BIA decision it was reviewing had discussed equal protection and found 
no violation.175 The Eleventh Circuit in Marti-Xiques referenced equal 
protection only once, in stating the Second Circuit’s holding in Francis.176 
Neither the Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia nor the Eleventh Circuit in 
Marti-Xiques explained why they were not addressing equal protection. 
Only the Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez177 and the Eleventh Circuit 
in Farquharson178 discussed equal protection arguments in more depth. 
Leal-Rodriguez argued that his right to equal protection under the law was 
violated when other noncitizens with much more serious criminal 
convictions could apply for relief under the former section 212(c) while he 
could not.179 In Leal-Rodriguez, the court explained the standard for 
determining equal protection violations as looking to whether there was a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the enactment of the 
immigration provision at issue.180 After stating this standard and explaining 
Leal-Rodriguez’s arguments, however, the court did not even attempt to 
apply it or refute respondent’s argument of an equal protection violation. 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit focused on its desire not to further judicially 
expand 212(c) beyond what was required by the rationale in Francis and 
Silva and held that the reasons to interfere with congressional intent were 
not sufficiently strong under the circumstances at issue.181 The court 
referenced the plenary power doctrine, although not by name, and 
expressed concern with meddling in Congress’ power to regulate 
immigration.182 
The Eleventh Circuit in Farquharson expressed the standard somewhat 
differently, evoking the minimal scrutiny test and stating, “A statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 893, 895, 896-97 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
 176. Marti-Xiques v. INS, 713 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on rehearing, 
724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984).  
 177. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 178. 246 F.3d at 1324. 
 179. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 951.  
 180. Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977)). The court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794, and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 
753, 770 (1972), for this standard. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 951. 
 181. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 952 (“To hold that the same form of discretionary relief 
must be available to aliens deportable for different, but arguably comparable, violations is to 
interfere again, on an even weaker rationale, with Congress’s scheme for regulating 
aliens.”). 
 182. Id. at 951-52. 
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distinction such as that challenged by Farquharson . . . will survive an equal 
protection challenge if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.”183 Although not articulated identically, 
this standard should, in practice, mean essentially the same thing as the 
standard asserted by the Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez.184 In 
application, however, the Eleventh Circuit diverged from the Seventh. Like 
the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned with further 
judicially stretching the meaning of the plain language of 212(c). Unlike the 
Seventh Circuit, however, the Eleventh Circuit looked for and found a 
“rational” reason for distinguishing noncitizens deportable for entry without 
inspection: “It is reasonable that the government would decline to offer a 
waiver to aliens deportable for entry without inspection, since illegal entry 
violations directly and fundamentally undermine the enforcement efforts of 
the INS.”185 
(2) Group Two: Firearm Offenses 
Unlike the cases involving entry without inspection, there was no circuit 
split with respect to cases in the second group, those involving charges of 
deportability based on firearm offenses. The circuit courts that considered 
the question held that the firearms-related grounds of deportability had no 
comparable ground of inadmissibility and that 212(c) was therefore not 
available to waive them. The significant cases in this second group include 
Cabasug v. INS186 and Komarenko v. INS187 in the Ninth Circuit, Campos v. 
INS188 in the First Circuit, Chow v. INS189 and Rodriguez v. INS190 in the 
Fifth Circuit, Rodriguez-Padron v. INS191 in the Eleventh Circuit, and 
Gjonaj v. INS192 in the Sixth Circuit. Despite reaching the same result, the 
courts took significantly different paths to get there, including with respect 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1324 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). 
 184. See, e.g., Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 316 (1st Cir. 1992) (connecting the two 
standards and explaining the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” language as the 
specific application of the minimal scrutiny test to an immigration law provision).  
 185. Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1325. 
 186. 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 187. 35 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203. 
 188. 961 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 189. 12 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 190. 9 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 191. 13 F.3d 1455 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 192. 47 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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to their invocation of Chevron deference and reliance on equal protection 
arguments.  
Only the Fifth Circuit in Chow and the Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez-
Padron specifically discussed Chevron deference. In Chow, as in the 
Seventh Circuit’s Leal-Rodriguez decision discussed earlier,193 part of the 
discussion regarding Chevron took place in the context of another 
argument—whether Chow was in fact deportable as charged for a firearms 
offense.194 There the Fifth Circuit clearly recognized that whether the law 
was ambiguous or unequivocal and whether the agency interpretation was 
reasonable were both part of the Chevron analysis.195 When the court in 
Chow reached the availability of 212(c), however, they stated only, citing 
Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca, “[B]ecause Congress has delegated the 
administration of the statutory scheme to the INS, its interpretation is 
entitled to strong deference.”196 It therefore addressed whether or not 
Chevron applied, but ignored the question of whether or not the law was 
unambiguous and addressed only implicitly whether the agency’s 
interpretation was reasonable.197 In support of its holding that 212(c) was 
unavailable for firearm offenses, it offered only favorable reference to its 
own memorandum opinion summarily affirming the Attorney General’s 
decision in Hernandez-Casillas and to the First Circuit’s decision in 
Campos, tacitly supporting the position that the agency’s interpretation in 
the case below was reasonable.198  
A second published Fifth Circuit case, Rodriguez v. INS, considering the 
availability of 212(c) for a charge of deportability for a firearms offense 
was decided just one month later and with one of the same judges on the 
panel.199 Oddly enough, the court in Rodriguez neither considered Chevron 
deference nor cited to its earlier decision in Chow.200 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 944-46 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 194. Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 38 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (citing Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished 
table decision); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 199. 9 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1993). Judge Garwood sat on the panel in both cases and wrote 
the court’s decision in Rodriguez. Id.; Chow, 12 F.3d 34. 
 200. Rodriguez relies on equal protection as the basis for its decision, 9 F.3d at 414, 
while Chow does not consider an equal protection argument. The Court in Rodriguez does 
state that its “review of immigration decisions is extremely limited.” Id. at 410 (citing Fiallo 
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
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The Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez-Padron addressed Chevron deference 
only briefly and only in the last paragraph of its opinion before the 
conclusion—essentially as an afterthought.201 The court held, relying only 
on Chevron: “Finally, and significantly, we note that the Attorney General’s 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme is entitled to deference.”202 
Skipping Chevron step one, the court then went on to find, without 
discussion, that the agency’s interpretation in Hernandez-Casillas was 
reasonable and did not misinterpret the statute.203 
The First Circuit in Campos did not mention the Chevron test or 
deference by name, but it did suggest a standard of review that amounted 
functionally to some level of deference to the agency: “While this court is 
not, of course, bound by the Attorney General’s opinion, we should 
disregard it only if it misconstrues the law or the Constitution.”204 The court 
provided no citation for this statement.205 Although the BIA’s decision in 
Granados206 was more arguably on point, the court here was apparently 
referring to the Attorney General’s decision in Hernandez-Casillas207 when 
it spoke of the Attorney General’s opinion.208 Despite stating throughout its 
decision that it was interpreting provisions of the INA—the statute the 
relevant agency was charged with administering—it did not discuss why it 
was not applying the Chevron two-step test.209 The court in Campos 
ultimately found that the Attorney General’s decision in Hernandez-
Casillas did not misinterpret 212(c) or other amendments to the 
immigration laws and, as discussed below, did not violate equal 
protection.210 Like many of the courts deciding these cases, the First Circuit 
strongly resisted what it described as further judicial “tinkering” with a 
statute already stretched beyond its literal meaning.211 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 202. Id. at 1460 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984)). 
 203. Id. at 1460-61. 
 204. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 314 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 205. See id. 
 206. Matter of Granado, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726 (BIA 1979), abrogated by Matter of 
Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182 (BIA 1984). 
 207. 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 208. Campos, 961 F.2d at 314. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at 313-17. 
 211. Id. at 315, 317. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/1
2017]        212(C) AND 212(H) WAIVERS 147 
 
 
The Ninth Circuit in Cabasug212 and Komarenko,213 the Fifth Circuit in 
Rodriguez,214 and the Sixth Circuit in Gjonaj215 did not cite to Chevron or 
even so much as allude to deference to the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute in the 212(c) context. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Cabasug made a 
contrary assertion, focused on Congress’ power to regulate immigration, 
alleging that the court decides “in accord with deference to the 
legislature.”216 The Ninth Circuit’s omission of any mention of Chevron in 
Komarenko in the 212(c) context is particularly curious because it cites and 
applies Chevron in another context, the agency’s interpretation of whether 
Komarenko should be barred from asylum for commission of a particularly 
serious crime.217 Of course, as in the entry without inspection cases, these 
courts could be simply proceeding from a presumption that Chevron does 
not apply, but they do not so state or explain why they think Chevron is 
inapplicable. 
Only Rodriguez-Padron in the Eleventh Circuit addressed both Chevron 
deference and equal protection,218 although as discussed above, the First 
Circuit in Campos functionally deferred to the agency and based its 
decision on equal protection.219 The Ninth Circuit in Cabasug and 
Komarenko and the Fifth Circuit in Rodriguez raised only equal 
protection.220 The Ninth, First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits do not differ 
from each other or the previously discussed entry without inspection cases 
as to the proper legal standard for the equal protection claims, at least in so 
far as the legal standard was discussed or is clear in the cases. The courts do 
depart in their applications of this standard, however, before coming back 
together to reach the same outcome. 
The Ninth Circuit in Cabasug did not discuss the legal standard for 
assessing an equal protection violation. In application, the court focused on 
the same distinction at stake in Francis and Silva and ultimately held that 
there was no group being treated differently because there was no 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 
1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 213. Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 
1203. 
 214. Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 215. Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 216. 847 F.2d at 1326. 
 217. Komarenko, 35 F.3d at 435-36. 
 218. Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1458-59, 1460 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 219. See Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 313-17 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 220. Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408, 413-14 (5th Cir. 1993); Komarenko, 35 F.3d at 435; 
Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1325-26. 
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“substantially identical” language in the grounds of exclusion: “By contrast 
with narcotics and marijuana cases, there exists no class of persons alike in 
carrying sawed-off shotguns or machine guns, and deportable or not 
depending on the irrelevant circumstance of whether at some previous time 
they took a temporary trip out of the country.”221 The court also considered 
whether Congress could treat specific criminal offenses differently without 
violating equal protection and concluded not only that Congress could but 
had expressed a particular concern with firearms offenses in a number of 
different contexts.222  
Six years later, the Ninth Circuit in Komarenko used a different analysis 
to reach the same result.223 The court in Komarenko began with the holding 
reached in previous cases, allegedly including Cabasug, that “when the 
basis upon which the INS seeks deportation is identical to a statutory 
ground for exclusion for which discretionary relief would be available, the 
equal protection component of the fifth amendment due process guarantee 
requires that discretionary relief be accorded in the deportation context as 
well.”224 It then considered whether firearms offenses were sufficiently 
“identical” to the ground of exclusion for crimes of moral turpitude to give 
rise to an equal protection violation and concluded that they were not.225 
The Ninth Circuit rejected an offense-specific approach that would have 
looked at whether the conviction that rendered the noncitizen deportable 
would also render him or her excludable.226  
Unlike the two Ninth Circuit cases, the First Circuit in Campos did 
discuss at length the applicability and standard for equal protection 
violations under the Fifth Amendment: “Under well-established principles, 
a challenged statute that does not employ a suspect classification or 
impinge upon fundamental rights must be upheld if it is rationally related to 
a legitimate governmental purpose.”227 In the immigration context, a statute 
is rationally related if “it is based upon a 'facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason.'”228 The court in Campos ultimately held that it was not irrational 
for Congress “to treat different crimes differently.”229 Significantly, the 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1325, 1326. 
 222. Id. at 1326-27. 
 223. See 35 F.3d 432. 
 224. Id. at 434 (quoting Gutierrez v. INS, 745 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 225. Id. at 434-35. 
 226. Id. at 435. 
 227. 961 F.2d 309, 315-16 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 
18, 23 (1st Cir. 1991)). 
 228. Id. at 316 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977)). 
 229. Id. 
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court appeared to focus primarily on the Attorney General’s decision in 
Hernandez-Casillas, which it described as “administratively dispositive,” to 
a lesser extent, on the Board’s decision in Campos below, and not at all on 
the Board’s decision in Granados or similar cases.230 This explains, at least 
in part, its more general focus on different types of crimes, like the Ninth 
Circuit in Cabasug, rather than specifically on firearms offenses, like the 
Ninth Circuit in Komarenko. 
The Fifth Circuit in Rodriguez v. INS purported to address an even 
broader contention, whether failing to allow all deportees to apply for a 
212(c) waiver violated equal protection.231 The court set out the same legal 
standard for equal protection violations as laid out by the First Circuit in 
Campos.232 Ultimately the court answered the question with reference back 
to firearms, holding that facially valid reasons for treating firearms offenses 
differently—a particular concern with this type of offender—existed.233 The 
court recognized that the distinctions were “confusing and arbitrary,” but 
nevertheless found them constitutional.234 By answering the question in this 
way, the court avoided the larger question it initially articulated.  
The Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez-Padron approached the equal 
protection question similarly to the courts in Cabasug, Campos, and 
Rodriguez. The court in Rodriguez-Padron identified the same legal 
standard and again held that it was rational for Congress to treat different 
crimes, and in particular firearms offenses, differently.235 
The Sixth Circuit in Gjonaj v. INS236 discussed neither Chevron 
deference nor equal protection. Its consideration of the availability of 
212(c) to waive a firearms ground of deportability was only a few sentences 
long.237 It simply cited to a number of the previously discussed opinions in 
support of its conclusion that the availability of 212(c) to waive grounds of 
deportability required a comparable ground of inadmissibility and firearms 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Id. at 314. 
 231. 9 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1993). Rodriguez may have been attempting to distinguish 
his case by framing the question in this way. As earlier discussed, a previous Fifth Circuit 
case, Chow, did not discuss equal protection at all. See Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
 232. Rodriguez, 9 F.3d at 414. The Rodriguez court cites both Campos and Cabasug. Id. 
 233. Id. at 414. 
 234. Id. 
 235. 13 F.3d 1455, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 236. 47 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 237. See id. at 827. 
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offenses did not have one.238 The court then “decline[d] to change this well-
established rule.”239  
(3) Pre-Repeal: Preliminary Conclusions 
While some of the pre-repeal decisions on the contours of the expanded 
application of 212(c) referenced Congress’ power to regulate immigration 
and cited to plenary power cases, the cases also applied ordinary 
administrative and constitutional law principles. None questioned whether 
these ordinary principles were applicable in the immigration realm, even in 
this somewhat unusual context of the judicial expansion of statutory relief 
that might have brought such questions into the foreground. 
As detailed in Section II.C.2.b, however, the courts varied significantly 
as to which administrative and constitutional law doctrines were invoked 
and the level of detail at which they were discussed. Chevron or other forms 
of deference to the agency’s decisions in particular received little analysis 
and portions of the doctrine were frequently omitted from the opinion with 
no discussion. These variations and omissions make patterns somewhat 
difficult to discern in the early case law. However, several overarching 
comments can be made. 
First, although the majority of the circuit courts in both the group one 
entry without inspection and the group two firearms offenses cases 
ultimately agreed with the agency that 212(c) relief was not available, the 
courts did not apply a very high level of deference in reaching these 
conclusions. Even among those decisions that referenced deference and 
purported to be applying it, courts undertook their own detailed analyses of 
the question independently of the agency’s analysis and the factors that the 
agency had considered. 
Second, there were not careful distinctions made between the various 
doctrines and steps of the doctrines; the courts’ analyses frequently 
combined supposedly disparate principles. In particular, the equal 
protection analysis was often collapsed into the Chevron step-two 
reasonableness inquiry. That is, courts appeared to consider whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the applicability of 212(c) was unreasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 238. Id. (citing Rodriguez-Padron, 13 F.3d at 1459-61; Rodriguez, 9 F.3d at 412-13; 
Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 948-51 (7th Cir. 1993); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 
311-14 (1st Cir. 1992); Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated 
by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam); Matter of Hernandez-
Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. 
INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision)). 
 239. Id. 
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because it violated equal protection. Courts also merged the question of 
Congress’ intent and the meaning of the statutory language (step one of the 
Chevron analysis) with step two, whether the agency’s interpretation of that 
language was reasonable. A number of courts also noted, however, how far 
the application of 212(c) had departed from the statutory language. This 
factor may have driven the collapse of the Chevron analysis into a single 
step in this context. 
No definitive ultimate conclusion or agreed upon application of the 
various doctrines was reached in the pre-repeal 212(c) cases. At the same 
time as the Board and circuit courts were struggling with the expanded 
applicability of 212(c), Congress was gradually restricting 212(c)’s 
availability.240 Congress repealed the waiver as part of the IIRIRA241 in 
1996—before the questions of which grounds of deportability or criminal 
offenses could be waived by section 212(c), or what standard should be 
applied in making that determination, could be answered definitively.  
2. Post-St. Cyr – Group Three: Aggravated Felonies 
While the questions of the contours of the expanded application of 
212(c) faded somewhat into the background for a period of time following 
the repeal of 212(c), they resurged after the Supreme Court’s decision in St. 
Cyr.242 The Supreme Court in St. Cyr ruled that the repeal of the waiver had 
an impermissible retroactive effect, and that the waiver must remain 
available to at least some noncitizens who were previously eligible.243 The 
Department of Homeland Security promulgated a final regulation meant to 
implement St. Cyr in 2004.244 Among other provisions, the final rule 
provided that 212(c) was unavailable where “[t]he alien is deportable under 
former section 241 of the Act or removable under section 237 of the Act on 
a ground which does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212 of the 
Act.”245 Cases in the third group, involving charges of deportability based 
on aggravated felonies, predominated in this post-regulation resurgence. 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See, e.g., Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2008); Matter of 
Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 256-57 (BIA 2014). 
 241. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 242. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 243. Id. at 314-26. 
 244. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2007); see 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) 
(2005). 
 245. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2005). This provision was not in the proposed rule, but was 
added pursuant to a commenter’s suggestion. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d at 97 (citing 
Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens With Certain Criminal Convictions Before April 1, 1997, 69 
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Relatively quickly after the regulations were issued in 2004, the BIA 
held that the regulation’s term “statutory counterpart” and case law’s 
“comparable ground” or “corresponding ground” all meant that similar 
language must have been used to describe substantially equivalent 
categories of offenses.246 Most circuits to consider the question agreed with 
the Board’s narrow interpretation, with the result that most noncitizens in 
group three with aggravated felony convictions would not be eligible for 
212(c) relief. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that a ground of 
deportability had a statutory counterpart if the offense that made the 
noncitizen deportable would also make him or her inadmissible.247 The 
Second Circuit’s position would have meant that a significantly larger 
group of noncitizens in group three could qualify for a 212(c) waiver. Just 
as in the pre-repeal cases, ordinary principles of administrative and 
constitutional law were almost unquestioningly invoked, but the circuit 
courts varied widely as to how they interpreted and applied the doctrines of 
Chevron deference and equal protection. Even more significantly, the 
Supreme Court weighed in on this question, and introduced the use of the 
APA’s arbitrary and capricious review for the first time in this context 
without significant discussion of why it chose to make this shift.248 
a) The Board – Matter of Blake and Matter of Brieva-Perez 
In 2005, the BIA applied and clarified this rule in two published cases 
decided just months apart: Matter of Blake249 and Matter of Brieva-
Perez.250 The noncitizen respondents in both Blake and Brieva-Perez were 
charged as deportable based on convictions for aggravated felonies—sexual 
abuse of a minor in Blake251 and a crime of violence in Brieva-Perez.252 The 
Board began by holding that the “statutory counterpart” phrase from the 
regulations had the same meaning as and could be employed 
                                                                                                                 
Fed. Reg. 57, 826, 57,831-32 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1212, and 
1240)). 
 246. Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (BIA 2005), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88; Matter of Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 772 (BIA 
2005), aff'd sub. nom. Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 247. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d at 104.  
 248. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 249. 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 2005). 
 250. 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (BIA 2005). 
 251. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 722-23. 
 252. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 767. 
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interchangeably with the previously used phrases “comparable ground” or 
“corresponding ground” from its case law.253  
Conviction of an aggravated felony is a ground of deportability under 
INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), but is not included by name within the 
grounds of inadmissibility. Aggravated felonies are defined within the INA 
and include at least twenty-one different categories of offenses.254 The 
Board held that whether a conviction for an aggravated felony had a 
statutory counterpart within the grounds of inadmissibility must be 
determined by looking at the specific aggravated felony charged.255 That is, 
the question was whether sexual abuse of a minor and crimes of violence 
had inadmissibility statutory counterparts.256 
The Board considered the argument that Blake’s and Brieva-Perez’s 
aggravated felonies had comparable grounds of inadmissibility because 
nearly all sexual abuse of a minor and crime of violence offenses would 
also render a noncitizen inadmissible as a crime involving moral 
turpitude.257 Ultimately, however, it held against this position. The Board 
announced a narrow, limiting rule for making this determination: 
“[W]hether a ground of deportation or removal has a statutory counterpart 
in the provisions for exclusion or inadmissibility turns on whether Congress 
has employed similar language to describe substantially equivalent 
categories of offenses.”258 “Considerable overlap” between two different 
categories, like that Blake and Brieva-Perez argued existed between 
aggravated felony crimes of violence or sexual abuse of a minor and crimes 
involving moral turpitude, was found to be insufficient.259  
The Board in both cases parsed precedent and the recently enacted 
Department of Justice regulation in a relatively formalistic manner to reach 
its conclusions without going into the background of how and why the 
statutory counterpart rule was initially adopted or justifying its narrow 
reading of the regulation. The Board’s rule meant that a noncitizen’s 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 727. 
 254. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). The actual number of individual 
aggravated felonies is higher as each category may contain more than one aggravated felony. 
For example, the Board in Blake determined that INA 101(a)(43)(A) contained three 
separate aggravated felony offenses. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 727.  
 255. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 728; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 772. 
 256. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 727; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 772. 
 257. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 723; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 771-73. 
 258. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 728; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 771. 
 259. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 728; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 771 ("In Blake, we 
found the mere overlap between 'sexual abuse of a minor' and some crimes involving moral 
turpitude insufficient to demonstrate that the provisions were statutory counterparts."). 
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eligibility for relief under the former section 212(c) could turn on the 
charging decision made by an officer of the Department of Homeland 
Security.260 Virtually identically situated respondents, then, could end up 
being treated very differently. The Board did not discuss the rationale 
underlying such a rule or any reasoning behind imposing it. It did not 
acknowledge, much less discuss, any equal protection implications of their 
holding. 
b) The Fifth Circuit – Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales 
The Board’s decision in Brieva-Perez was appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and affirmed in Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales.261 
The Fifth Circuit filed its decision on the same date as two other companion 
cases: Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, involving charges of deportability for 
the aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor,262 and Vo v. Gonzales, 
involving charges of deportability for two aggravated felonies, a crime of 
violence and a theft or burglary offense.263 All three cases were heard and 
decided by the same three-judge panel.264 Brieva-Perez did not directly 
challenge the Board’s interpretation of “statutory counterpart” in his 
case,265 although he did argue unsuccessfully that denying him the 
opportunity to apply for 212(c) relief was a violation of equal protection.266 
The Fifth Circuit held, without much explanation, that he failed to 
demonstrate he was being treated differently than other similarly situated 
noncitizens.267 Avilez-Granados was a relatively brief decision with little 
analysis beyond citation to the Board’s decision in Blake.268 The Fifth 
Circuit’s rationale for adopting the Board’s rule requiring textual similarity 
between the charged ground of deportability and a ground of inadmissibility 
                                                                                                                 
 260. See, e.g., Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 772 n.4 (rejecting Brieva-Perez’s 
argument that his conviction should be considered a theft offense for purposes of the 
statutory counterpart analysis because he was charged with a crime of violence). 
 261. 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 262. 481 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 263. 482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 264. Chief Judge Edith H. Jones wrote all three decisions; Judges Jacque L. Wiener and 
Rhesa H. Barksdale also served on the panel. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 356; Avilez-
Granados, 481 F.3d at 869; Vo, 482 F.3d at 363. 
 265. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 359 n.2. 
 266. Id. at 361-62. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Avilez-Granados, 481 F.3d at 871-72. 
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to constitute a statutory counterpart was contained primarily in the third 
companion case, Vo.269  
Vo involved a respondent charged as deportable for two aggravated 
felonies, a crime of violence and a theft or burglary offense, both based on 
his Texas conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.270 After going 
through the history of 212(c) relief and its expansion, the court held that 
Vo’s unauthorized use of a motor vehicle conviction did not have a 
statutory counterpart in the grounds of exclusion and therefore could not be 
waived by section 212(c).271 While this phrasing is somewhat odd in its 
reference to the criminal offense rather than the ground(s) of deportability 
charged, the court discussed Blake and Brieva-Perez in an overwhelmingly 
positive manor, so it does not appear that the Fifth Circuit was trying to 
alter the standard or analysis as laid out by the Board there. It is more likely 
that the Fifth Circuit simply did not understand what it was doing in 
referring to Vo’s conviction rather than his charges of deportability. 
The Fifth Circuit considered multiple arguments raised by Vo against 
endorsing the Blake/Brieva-Perez standard in his case.272 Most 
significantly, for purposes of this article, the court considered whether the 
agency’s interpretation in Blake and Brieva-Perez was unreasonable as an 
unjustified departure from past agency precedent273 and whether application 
of this rule to noncitizens in Vo’s circumstances would violate 
constitutional equal protection rights.274 The court held first that the rule 
announced by the Board in Blake was not new but longstanding: “Vo has 
not demonstrated a substantial shift in agency practice sufficient to render 
the BIA’s interpretation of its own regulation irrational or arbitrary and 
capricious.”275 Although the court used language identical to section 
706(2)(A) of the APA, it did not cite to the APA or any other source in 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 366-72. All three decisions also cite to a prior Fifth 
Circuit case, De La Paz Sanchez v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 2006), that 
reached the same conclusion without explanation in reliance on the Board’s decision in 
Matter of Brieva-Perez. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 362; Avilez-Granados, 481 F.3d at 872; 
Vo, 482 F.3d at 369, 372. 
 270. 482 F.3d at 365. 
 271. Id. at 366-69. 
 272. Id. at 368-72. 
 273. Id. at 369-70.  
 274. Id. at 371-72. In addition to these two arguments, the court also rejected Vo’s claims 
that the Board’s holding violated St. Cyr, that the regulation and the Board’s interpretation of 
it in Blake and Brieva-Perez were ultra vires the statute, and that the Board’s interpretation 
of the regulation rendered it internally inconsistent. Id. at 370-71. 
 275. Id. at 370. 
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support of this standard.276 On the question of equal protection, the Fifth 
Circuit held that, even if excludable and deportable noncitizens could be 
considered similarly situated, encouraging deportable aliens to leave the 
country was a rational reason to distinguish between them by making 
212(c) available to waive exclusion but not deportation.277 
Despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit clearly followed the Board’s 
position in all three cases—Brieva-Perez, Avilez-Granados, and Vo—the 
Fifth Circuit’s discussion and application of the legal standard regarding 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is particularly unclear 
and confusing. First, none of the three cases cite to Chevron or invoke, even 
without name, the Chevron two-step test. The court in Vo does briefly cite 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cardoza-Fonseca when explaining Vo’s 
argument that the Board’s interpretation does not deserve deference 
because it impermissibly departs from past agency precedent, but that 
citation comes without discussion of the standard.278 On the other side of 
the coin, Vo alludes to congressional power and the plenary power doctrine: 
“Additionally, in the immigration context, there is a particular need for 
courts to defer to congressional choices.”279  
Second, despite being decided by the very same three-judge panel and 
concerning the same basic legal issue, the discussion of deference is 
different. Avilez-Granados and Vo contain the same stock sentence 
regarding deference: “We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, 
according deference to the BIA’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions 
of the INA.”280 In support of that sentence, the court cites to the same Fifth 
Circuit case: Carbajal-Gonzales v. INS.281 Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales 
contains essentially the same stock sentence with only minor, irrelevant 
differences,282 but, surprisingly, cites to another Fifth Circuit case 
altogether in support of the standard: Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore.283  
                                                                                                                 
 276. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2) (2012). 
 277. Vo, 482 F.3d at 371-72. 
 278. Id. at 369. 
 279. Id. at 372. 
 280. Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 2007); Vo, 482 F.3d at 
366. 
 281. 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 282. 482 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Questions of law are reviewed de novo, 
according deference to the BIA’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the INA.”). 
 283. Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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Carbajal-Gonzales contains a very similar stock sentence at the end of 
its recitation of the standard of review.284 In support of this sentence, it does 
refer to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron by name.285 The Chevron 
test, or any kind of deference to an agency legal interpretation, however, 
plays no more role in the court’s decision, probably because the court was 
concerned with whether Carbajal-Gonzales’s conduct met a particular legal 
standard (the grounds of deportability for entry without inspection and alien 
smuggling) rather than the Board’s interpretation of any legal standard.286  
Hernandez-Castillo also contains a similar stock sentence, but one that 
differs in at least one important word.287 Rather than referring simply to a 
conclusion of law, the court in Hernandez-Castillo refers specifically to the 
interpretation of an immigration regulation.288 In support, the court cites not 
to Chevron, but to another Fifth Circuit decision, Lopez-Gomez v. 
Ashcroft.289 In Lopez-Gomez, the court was really concerned with 
interpreting a regulation rather than some other source of law.290 In 
Hernandez-Castillo, on the other hand, the court was discussing the 
application of the repeal of 212(c); while there is the regulation enacted to 
implement the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr, that regulation does not 
appear to have been discussed or at issue in Hernandez-Castillo.291 
Hernandez-Castillo, then, probably cites Lopez-Gomez inappropriately; the 
actual standard in Lopez-Gomez for review of agency interpretation of its 
own regulations is inapplicable to the situation under consideration.292  
The court in Hernandez-Castillo goes on to make a statement 
specifically about its own application of this standard of review in a case 
involving section 212(c): “In this case, no deference is owed to the IJ’s 
                                                                                                                 
 284. 78 F.3d at 197 (“This court reviews conclusions of law de novo (although with the 
usual deference to the Board’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the Act . . . .”). 
 285. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 286. See id. at 197-201. 
 287. 436 F.3d at 519 (“We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, although we 
defer to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration regulations if that interpretation is 
reasonable.”). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. (citing Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 290. 263 F.3d at 444. 
 291. 436 F.3d 516. 
 292. While the standard for judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
rule is somewhat muddled, agency interpretation of a regulation is probably due less 
deference (is less controlling) than agency interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Skidmore v. 
Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 
12.05[B] (6th ed. 2012). 
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conclusion of law regarding the availability of § 212(c) relief because that 
conclusion was based on principles of retroactivity rather than the content 
of the immigration regulations.”293 Likely because of this seemingly helpful 
statement, and probably unaware of the mis-citation in Hernandez-Castillo, 
the Fifth Circuit in Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales compounds the mistake by 
citing Hernandez-Castillo. Again, the same regulation implementing St. 
Cyr was potentially at issue in Brieva-Perez, but there was no clear 
indication that the court was focused on that regulation when discussing 
deference. Even if the Brieva-Perez court was focused on interpreting the 
regulation, it failed to explain why the interpretation of the regulation was 
significant there but the interpretation of the statute was the focus in the 
virtually identical situations in its companion cases Vo and Avilez-
Granados. Although it would indicate sloppy draftsmanship, the court in 
Brieva-Perez may also have assumed that “regulation” was being used in its 
general sense of a legal standard rather than in its specific sense of a rule 
promulgated according to the APA’s requirements for notice and comment 
rulemaking. 
This may seem like overly finicky parsing of only tangentially relevant 
language, and to a certain extent it is. I do not want to make too much of the 
precise nature of the apparent mistakes made by the court, as that is not 
what is important here. Rather, I want to highlight that such an error could 
be made in one case in this context, where the same three-judge panel also 
released decisions on the same legal issue in two other cases on the same 
day where they did not make the same error. Furthermore, I want to 
emphasize the subject matter of the mistake: the application of, and 
standard for, deference to the agency’s interpretation of a provision of 
immigration law. This issue paints in particularly stark relief the substantial 
confusion among the circuit courts regarding just how to apply the ordinary 
principles of administrative law to actions of the immigration agencies, at 
least in the context of 212(c) relief. 
Most of the circuit courts to consider a similar question agreed with the 
Board in Blake and Brieva-Perez, and therefore agreed with the Fifth 
Circuit in Brieva-Perez, Avilez-Granados, and Vo. The general consensus 
was that (1) grounds of deportability could be waived by 212(c) only where 
Congress had employed similar language to describe a substantially 
equivalent category of excludable offenses and (2) most aggravated felonies 
did not have a sufficiently similar statutory counterpart in the grounds of 
                                                                                                                 
 293. 436 F.3d at 519. 
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inadmissibility.294 At least the First,295 Third,296 Seventh,297 Eighth,298 and 
Eleventh299 Circuits all took this position.  
Most of these courts at least briefly considered and dismissed an equal 
protection argument on the grounds that deportable noncitizens were not 
similarly situated to excludable noncitizens where there was no 
corresponding ground of inadmissibility.300 Because these courts held that 
equal protection concerns were not triggered, they had no opportunity to 
consider whether there was some rational basis for the differing treatment 
of noncitizens with less serious criminal convictions or the distinctions 
between noncitizens charged as deportable or excludable. 
Only three of the courts, the Third Circuit in Caroleo v. Gonzales, the 
Eighth Circuit in Vue v. Gonzales, and the Eleventh Circuit in De la Rosa, 
explicitly considered deference to the agency’s interpretation of the INA 
under Chevron.301 The Eighth Circuit in Vue announced that it gives 
“substantial deference” to the Board’s statutory interpretations and lists the 
Chevron two-step test.302 It did not, however, appear to apply this standard 
                                                                                                                 
 294. One notable exception is the aggravated felony illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(B) (2012). The Board of 
Immigration Appeals held that this aggravated felony did have a comparable ground of 
inadmissibility, violation of any law relating to a controlled substance under then INA § 
212(a)(23). Matter of Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257, 258-59 (BIA 1991); see also Matter of 
Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 729 (BIA 2005), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Blake v. 
Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 295. Fontes v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2007) (aggravated felony, crime of 
violence); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (same), abrogated by Judulang v. 
Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 296. Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 2007) (aggravated felony, crime of 
violence, and theft or burglary offense), abrogated by Judulang, 565 U.S. 42. 
 297. Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (aggravated felony, 
sexual abuse of a minor); Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (same). 
 298. Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007) (aggravated felony, crime of 
violence); Soriano v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (same). 
 299. De la Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) (aggravated felony, 
sexual abuse of a minor); Rubio v. U.S. Att’y Gen, 182 Fed. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(aggravated felony, theft or burglary offense). 
 300. See De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1337-39; Zamora-Mallari, 514 F.3d at 692-93; Fontes, 
483 F.3d at 120-23; Valere, 473 F.3d at 762; Vue, 496 F.3d at 861-62; Kim, 468 F.3d at 62-
63. The Third Circuit in Caroleo discussed equal protection only in its discussion of other 
cases. 476 F.3d at 163, 165. 
 301. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1332; Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 163, 165; Vue, 496 F.3d at 859. 
 302. Vue, 496 F.3d at 859 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Jamieson v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 2004)) (“This court reviews the BIA’s 
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in its analysis, despite the fact that it adopted the Board’s statutory 
counterpart analysis for the application of 212(c) to waive grounds of 
deportability.303 The Eleventh Circuit did likewise.304 
The Third Circuit in Caroleo first undertook its own discussion of cases 
in other circuit courts.305 The court then stated, without discussion of the 
standard, that the Board’s interpretations of the INA were entitled to 
deference and cited to Chevron as well as another Third Circuit case.306 The 
Third Circuit recognized 
the seeming illogic of a scheme under which the crime of 
attempted murder may constitute a crime involving moral 
turpitude rendering the alien removable, while the same alien, if 
charged with being removable under INA section 237’s 
aggravated felony "crime of violence" ground, is ineligible for § 
212(c) relief because a "crime of violence" is not a statutory 
counterpart of a "crime involving moral turpitude."307  
However, it still did not discuss whether the Board’s decision was 
unreasonable under step two of the Chevron standard and ultimately 
adopted the Board’s interpretation. 
c) The Second Circuit – Blake v. Carbone 
The Second Circuit took the position contrary to the Fifth Circuit and 
other circuits previously discussed. The Board’s decision in Blake 
ultimately had the opposite outcome on appeal of the Board’s decision in 
Brieva-Perez. Blake was appealed to the Second Circuit.308 Although the 
Board in Blake had asserted that its approach was consistent with Second 
Circuit precedent,309 the Second Circuit reversed and remanded in a 
                                                                                                                 
determinations on questions of law de novo, but gives substantial deference to its statutory 
interpretations.”). 
 303. See id. at 859-62. Interestingly, the court goes back to an earlier BIA case, Matter of 
Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (BIA 1984), rather than citing to the Board’s more recent 
decisions in Blake or Brieva-Perez as the source for this analysis. Vue, 496 F.3d at 860. 
 304. See De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1335-37. 
 305. 476 F.3d at 163-67. 
 306. Id. at 166 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648 
(3d Cir. 2006)). 
 307. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). 
 308. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 309. Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728-29 (BIA 2005) (citing Drax v. Reno, 338 
F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2003); Cato v. INS, 84 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1996)), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88. 
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published decision.310 The Second Circuit relied on the same equal 
protection principle it had enunciated in Francis v. INS to hold that the 
Board’s rule violated equal protection by treating similarly situated 
noncitizens differently.311 The court held that the focus should be on the 
offense itself rather than on the ground of deportability.312 That is, a 
noncitizen will be eligible for a waiver under the former section 212(c) if 
the offense that he or she is seeking to waive would also render him or her 
inadmissible.313 
The Second Circuit in Blake considered but rejected the government’s 
argument that they should defer to the Board’s interpretation of eligibility 
for a 212(c) waiver.314 The court seems to have primarily based its analysis 
on step one of the Chevron analysis, holding that there was no ambiguity in 
the language of the 212(c) statute itself, and that therefore the court and the 
agency must defer to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”315 
There is also language in the court’s decision, however, that suggests that 
the Second Circuit viewed the situation as falling outside of the Chevron 
framework entirely.316 Any difficulty in apply section 212(c), the court 
noted, arose not from the statute but from the BIA’s “gloss” on the Second 
Circuit’s prior decision in Francis.317 Francis had interpreted 212(c) to 
avoid a constitutional infirmity—the violation of equal protection—that 
would have otherwise existed.318  
None of the other circuits officially adopted or indicated approval of the 
Second Circuit’s position in Blake. At least two of the circuits did, 
however, remand with instructions to consider the Second Circuit’s 
position.319 The Seventh Circuit, in a published decision regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel, stated that, on remand, the Board “may 
wish to reconsider its prejudice ruling in light of the Second Circuit's 
                                                                                                                 
 310. Blake, 489 F.3d at 105. 
 311. Id. at 91. 
 312. Id. at 104. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 100 (“We find no reason to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory 
counterpart rule . . . .”). 
 315. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984)). 
 316. Id. (“We . . . conclude that the BIA’s comparable grounds analysis fails to comport 
with Francis.”). 
 317. Id.  
 318. Id. (citing Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 898 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 319. See, e.g., Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 688 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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decision in Blake v. Carbone.”320 The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished 
decision, remanded to the Board to directly reconsider the respondent’s 
eligibility for 212(c) where the Board relied on its previous decision in 
Blake to find him ineligible.321 
d) The Ninth Circuit – Abebe v. Mukasey 
Despite the multiplicity of outcomes, standards, and frameworks in the 
cases previously discussed, the rule adopted by the Second Circuit in 
Francis and the Board in Silva remained the underlying bedrock. Individual 
courts, likely frustrated with the resulting complexity of the law, did 
criticize these decisions.322 By and large, however, courts did not consider 
overruling or departing from their holding that it would violate equal 
protection to deny similarly situated noncitizens charged as deportable the 
opportunity to apply for relief under section 212(c). The Second Circuit’s 
decision in Blake, holding that 212(c) must be available for all offenses that 
would also render an alien excludable, followed directly from Francis.323 
Even the Fifth Circuit in the Brieva-Perez trio of cases, in addition to other 
courts refusing to expand Francis beyond grounds of deportability having 
textually similar excludability counterparts, did not seriously question the 
underlying holding in Francis and Silva.324 The Ninth Circuit was initially 
part of this group, affirmatively adopting the rule of Francis and Silva in a 
1981 case, Tapia-Acuna v. INS,325 but thereafter resisting further expansion 
                                                                                                                 
 320. Gutierrez-Almazan v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 341, 344 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007). The Board 
had previously held that Gutierrez-Almazan could not demonstrate prejudice because he was 
ineligible for 212(c) relief. Id. (“Gutierrez-Almazan also challenges the BIA's holding that 
he could not show prejudice from Trigo's ineffective assistance because he was ineligible for 
a § 212(c) waiver."). 
 321. Palomino-Abad v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 229 Fed. App'x. 891, 892 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(“Without expressing any opinion about the issues raised in Palomino’s petition for review 
or Palomino’s eligibility for § 212(c) relief, we GRANT the petition, VACATE the order 
denying reconsideration, and REMAND this case to the BIA for the purpose of allowing the 
BIA to consider Palomino’s motion to reconsider in light of Blake v. Carbone.”). 
 322. See, e.g., Blake, 489 F.3d at 105. (“While hindsight might pin much of this 
confusion on Francis, we are bound to finish what our predecessors started.”); Kim v. 
Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2006), abrogated by Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 
(2011). 
 323. See Blake, 489 F.3d at 101-05. 
 324. Breiva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007); Avilez-Granados v. 
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 325. 640 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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of the availability of 212(c).326 After initially mirroring the approach of the 
Board and the Fifth Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit ultimately took a 
third approach in a case called Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II), an 
aggressively litigated case resulting in multiple different decisions.327 
The Ninth Circuit first decided Abebe v. Gonzales (Abebe I) in 2007.328 
Abebe was charged as deportable for an aggravated felony conviction, 
specifically sexual abuse of a minor, based on his California conviction for 
lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child.329 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
Board correctly determined that Abebe was not eligible for a waiver under 
section 212(c) because this aggravated felony did not have a comparable 
ground of inadmissibility.330 The Ninth Circuit engaged in a relatively 
straightforward application of the Chevron two-step test to the Board’s 
interpretation of 212(c) as announced in its decisions in Blake and Brieva-
Perez.331 While it is certainly possible to disagree substantively with not 
only the outcome but also with multiple aspects of the legal holdings of this 
decision, the court’s opinion here is a model of clarity in comparison to 
many of the decisions previously discussed. It is at a minimum apparent 
what test the Ninth Circuit was applying, what it was holding at each step 
of the analysis, and why it so held. 
The Ninth Circuit initially held in Abebe I that, at step one of the 
Chevron test, Congress had not spoken clearly; 212(c) itself was subject to 
multiple interpretations.332 This portion of the holding was made without 
significant discussion or application of a legal standard, but was 
presumably based in large part on the court’s extensive discussion of the 
history of the 212(c) provision earlier in its decision.333 The court then went 
on to consider step two of the Chevron analysis—that is, to determine 
whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable. The court considered 
first the consistency of the Board’s interpretation with the statute, 
regulations, and prior agency practice; and second constitutional concerns 
                                                                                                                 
 326. See Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Abebe II, 
554 F.3d 1203; Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1326 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe 
II, 554 F.3d 1203. 
 327. 554 F.3d 1203. 
 328. 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007. 
 329. Id. at 1094-95. 
 330. Id. at 1094. 
 331. Id. at 1100-01 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). 
 332. Id. at 1101. 
 333. Id. at 1096-1101. 
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raised by the Board’s position.334 On the equal protection question, the 
court relied on its prior decision in Komarenko to hold that there was no 
violation.335 Because Abebe was not “facing deportation on a basis which 
'is identical to a statutory ground for exclusion for which discretionary 
relief would be available,'” there were not actually two similarly situated 
groups being treated differently.336 The court again specifically refused to 
extend its holding in Tapia-Acuna beyond the limited situation of grounds 
of deportability with textually similar excludability counterparts.337 
This Ninth Circuit decision in Abebe I, however, did not survive. After a 
somewhat tortured procedural history, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit 
issued the court’s final substantive decision in the Abebe II litigation on 
January 5, 2009.338 Despite strong opposition from both the concurrence339 
and the dissent,340 the panel in Abebe II overruled the Ninth Circuit’s 
previous decision in Tapia-Acuna and withdrew from the court’s adoption 
of the standard in Francis and Silva.341 The court held that refusing to allow 
noncitizens charged as deportable to avail themselves of the 212(c) waiver 
of inadmissibility did not violate equal protection because there was a 
rational basis for Congress to distinguish between noncitizens charged as 
inadmissible and those charged as deportable: “Congress could have limited 
section 212(c) relief to aliens seeking to enter the country from abroad in 
order 'to create[] an incentive for deportable aliens to leave the country.'”342 
The court therefore concluded that a waiver under section 212(c) was not 
available to Abebe to waive his deportability as an aggravated felon.343 
Unlike in its previous decision in Abebe I, the Ninth Circuit here did not 
                                                                                                                 
 334. Id. at 1101-05.  
 335. Id. at 1104-05. 
 336. Id. at 1104 (quoting Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled 
by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam)); see also id. at 1105 
(“Had [Abebe] left the United States and returned after his conviction, he could not have 
been excluded on a 'sexual abuse of a minor' theory because no such ground of 
inadmissibility exists.”). 
 337. Id. at 1104-05. 
 338. 554 F.3d 1203. 
 339. Id. at 1208-13 (Clifton, J., concurring).  
 340. Id. at 1213-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 341. Id. at 1207 (majority opinion). 
 342. Id. at 1206 (alteration in original) (quoting Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 
F.3d 299, 309 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
 343. Id. at 1207. 
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refer to Chevron or any other kind of deference to an agency 
determination.344 
Abebe’s request for en banc panel rehearing or full court rehearing en 
banc was denied over a vehement dissent on August 18, 2009.345 Abebe 
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, but his petition 
was denied on May 17, 2010.346 Amidst the multiple decisions in the Abebe 
litigation, however, another case involving the same legal question worked 
its way up to the Ninth Circuit and would eventually be heard by the 
Supreme Court in Judulang v. Holder.347  
3. The Supreme Court – Judulang v. Holder 
Judulang was placed in removal proceedings on a charge that a 
conviction for voluntary manslaughter was an aggravated felony crime of 
violence and therefore rendered him removable from the United States.348 
The BIA found him ineligible for relief under the former section 212(c) 
because, it held, aggravated felony crimes of violence do not have a 
substantially similar statutory counterpart in the grounds of exclusion.349 
The Ninth Circuit agreed in an unpublished and brief decision, relying on 
its initial decision in Abebe I as controlling.350 Only two short paragraphs of 
the opinion were devoted to this holding, with no new analysis or 
explanation.351 In addition to Abebe I, the court cited only to the Board’s 
decision in Brieva-Perez and the Third Circuit’s opinion in Caroleo.352 
                                                                                                                 
 344. The dissenting opinion does cite to Chevron and point out related implications of the 
court’s decisions, but does not otherwise discuss or apply Chevron deference. Id. at 1217 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“By holding that the statutory language of section 212(c) is clear 
and that Francis and Tapia-Acuna did not 'accord[] sufficient deference' to Congress, the 
majority has implicitly questioned DHS’s authority to enact the above regulation. Under the 
majority rule, the regulation that has been applied in thousands of cases cannot survive.” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 345. Abebe v. Holder (Abebe III), 577 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (mem.). 
 346. Abebe v. Holder, 560 U.S. 903 (2010) (mem.). 
 347. 565 U.S. 42 (2011).  
 348. Id. at 51-52. 
 349. Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 Fed. App’x 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd and 
remanded, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42. 
 350. Id. (citing Abebe I, 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent 
decisions in the Abebe litigation occurred after this decision in Judulang. See Abebe III, 577 
F.3d 1113. 
 351. Judulang, 249 Fed. App’x at 502. 
 352. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
166 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:111 
 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Judulang on April 18, 2011, to 
resolve a circuit split.353 Oral arguments were held on October 12, 2011, 
and the Supreme Court issued its decision on December 12, 2011.354 The 
Court rejected the Chevron and equal protection frameworks that the Ninth 
Circuit had relied on below to find Judulang ineligible for section 212(c) 
relief and that are the two common threads running through the 
jurisprudence on the expansion of 212(c).355 Instead, the Court chose to 
analyze the case through the lens of the APA.356  
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found 
to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”357 The Supreme Court explained that, in order to 
comply with this section of the statute, an agency—when setting policy—
must provide a reasoned explanation, based on “non-arbitrary, 'relevant 
factors,'” for its choices.358 In the immigration context, this means “that the 
BIA's approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the 
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration 
system.”359 The Supreme Court held that the BIA’s approach failed this 
test: “Rather than considering factors that might be thought germane to the 
deportation decision, that policy hinges § 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant 
comparison between statutory provisions.”360 The Court used highly critical 
language to highlight at length what it viewed as the extreme and 
multilayered arbitrariness of the BIA’s holding.361 It described the 
                                                                                                                 
 353. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52 n.6 (“Compare Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 103 (C.A.2 
2007) (rejecting the BIA's approach and holding instead that '[i]f the offense that renders [an 
alien] deportable would render a similarly situated [alien] excludable, the deportable [alien] 
is eligible for a waiver of deportation'), with Koussan v. Holder, 556 F.3d 403, 412-14 
(C.A.6 2009) (upholding the comparable-grounds policy); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 
158, 162-63, 168 (C.A.3 2007) (same); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62-63 (C.A.1 2006) 
(same).”). 
 354. 565 U.S. 42.  
 355. The Court did not reach the equal protection argument, finding it unnecessary given 
its holding that the Board’s position was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 54 n.8. As discussed 
below, the Court considered and rejected the Chevron framework. Id. at 52 n.7. 
 356. Id. at 52-53. 
 357. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 358. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. See id. at 55-59. 
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comparable-grounds rule as turning deportation decisions into a “sport of 
chance.”362  
The government argued before the Supreme Court that the Board’s 
position was not arbitrary and capricious for three separate reasons: (1) it 
was more consistent with the statutory language, (2) the Board’s approach 
had been consistent and longstanding, and (3) the comparable-grounds rule 
saved the government time and money.363 The Court rejected each of these 
arguments in turn.364 
 Judulang in his initial brief argued his case under the APA arbitrary and 
capricious framework.365 He did not explain why this approach was more 
appropriate than the Chevron deference relied on by the Ninth Circuit 
below, but did state in a footnote that both the analysis and the result would 
be the same under Chevron: “Whether understood under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), or under the second step of Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), the standard is the 
same: whether the BIA’s policy is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”366 
The Attorney General, on the other hand, argued the case under Chevron 
deference367 without addressing the use of the arbitrary and capricious 
framework, other than to assert that Judulang conceded the applicability of 
Chevron.368 None of the amicus briefs addressed this choice between 
administrative law frameworks. This is somewhat remarkable given the 
significant shift this represented; none of the prior major cases on the 
expansion of 212(c) to deportability had invoked the APA arbitrary and 
capricious standard. 
                                                                                                                 
 362. Id. at 58-59 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 
879 (2nd Cir. 1947)). 
 363. Id. at 59-64. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Brief for Petitioner at 31-55, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Judulang’s 
petition for certiorari proceeded in the same manner, arguing that the BIA’s interpretation 
was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA without discussing why this framework 
should be substituted for the Chevron deference employed by the Ninth Circuit below. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, 26, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). 
 366. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at 44 n.16 (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. 
& Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)). 
 367. Brief for Respondent at 18-30, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Specifically, 
the Attorney General argued that the statutory language of 212(c) is ambiguous at Chevron 
step one and the Board’s reasonable interpretation of that language was entitled to deference 
at Chevron step two. Id. at 18-20. 
 368. Id. at 19. 
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The Supreme Court addressed the choice of framework only in a 
footnote. Before electing to proceed under the framework of the APA, the 
Supreme Court specifically considered Chevron but found Chevron 
deference inapplicable to the situation at hand.369 The Court explained that 
in order for Chevron deference to be triggered, the agency must be 
interpreting a statute it has been charged with administering.370 The Board’s 
comparable-grounds rule could not be a statutory interpretation, in 
significant part because 212(c) does not even mention grounds of 
deportation.371 
The Supreme Court makes a point of saying, however, that it would 
undergo the same analysis and reach the same conclusion at step two of the 
Chevron analysis if it had elected to proceed in that direction: “Were we to 
do so, our analysis would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we 
ask whether an agency interpretation is 'arbitrary or capricious in 
substance.'”372 The Court thereby implies, although it does not state, that it 
would find Congress had not spoken clearly in the statute itself at Chevron 
step one; that it would not use the statutory interpretation principle of 
constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute at Chevron step one; and 
that it would not need to rely on constitutional avoidance arguments to 
reject the agency’s comparable-grounds rule as unreasonable at Chevron 
step two.373 
Both Judulang and the Attorney General (as well as an amicus brief) 
addressed equal protection arguments at some substantial length.374 
Judulang framed his equal protection argument as part of the arbitrary and 
capricious analysis,375 while the Attorney General addressed equal 
protection as part of its Chevron step-two analysis.376 The Supreme Court, 
however, also relegated its treatment of equal protection to a footnote and 
appeared to treat equal protection as a stand-alone question.377 The Court 
indicated that it did not appear as though similarly situated noncitizens were 
                                                                                                                 
 369. Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 at 52 n.7. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 
53 (2011)). 
 373. See id. 
 374. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at 51-53; Brief for Respondent, supra note 367, 
at 49-54; Brief for Amici Curiae 39 Immigration Law Professors In Support Of Petitioner at 
6-19, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). 
 375. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at 51-53. 
 376. Brief for Respondent, supra note 367, at 49-54. 
 377. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 54 n.8. 
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being treated differently, but declined to reach the equal protection 
argument given its holding that the BIA’s comparable-grounds analysis was 
arbitrary and capricious.378 
 Notably, the Supreme Court did not tell the BIA what test it should 
adopt; it simply stated that the test the BIA had chosen was arbitrary and 
capricious.379 The question of which alternative test to select and apply was 
left to the Board to decide in a subsequent case.380 The Board made this 
selection in a February 2014 decision in a case called Matter of 
Abdelghany, a case that was pending at the time the Supreme Court decided 
Judulang in 2011.381 The Board in Abdelghany engaged in lengthy 
discussion of the history of congressional limitations in 212(c) relief, the 
Supreme Court precedents Judulang and St. Cyr, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various available alternatives to the comparable-grounds 
test. Ultimately, the Board adopted the same test it had endorsed in its 
Hernandez-Casillas opinion twenty-some years earlier.382 That is, 
“otherwise qualified applicants may apply for section 212(c) relief in 
removal proceedings to waive any ground of deportability, unless the 
applicant is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility” specifically excluded 
by section 212(c).383 The Board then went on to consider and resolve other 
contested aspects of eligibility for relief under the former section 212(c) in 
an extremely comprehensive decision for the stated purpose of adopting a 
“uniform nationwide rule.”384 Despite this lofty goal, however, unanswered 
questions remain in the 212(c) context.385 
  
                                                                                                                 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at 57-58, 64 (“Again, we do not say today that the BIA must give all deportable 
aliens meeting § 212(c)'s requirements the chance to apply for a waiver. The point is instead 
that the BIA cannot make that opportunity turn on the meaningless matching of statutory 
grounds.” (citation omitted)). 
 380. Id. at 64; Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 259 (BIA 2014) (“After St. 
Cyr and Judulang, the basic question remains: which deportable lawful permanent residents 
may apply for section 212(c) relief?”). 
 381. Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 265-66. 
 382. Id.; Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 262-66 (BIA 1990, A.G. 
1991) aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished 
table decision). 
 383. Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 266. 
 384. Id. at 266-72. 
 385. See, e.g., United States v. Gill, 748 F.3d 491, 503 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Abdelghany 
in support of holding 212(c) relief available for a conviction obtained after trial). 
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4. Post-Repeal: Preliminary Conclusions 
As in the pre-repeal decisions on the contours of the expanded 
application of 212(c), some of the post-repeal decisions referenced 
Congress’ power to regulate immigration and cited to plenary power 
cases.386 All of the significant circuit court cases, however, also applied 
ordinary administrative and constitutional law principles. Not only did no 
court seriously question whether these ordinary principles were applicable 
in the immigration realm, Chevron deference, arbitrary and capricious 
review, and equal protection became more deeply entrenched in this 
context. As a result, court decisions applying these principles began to more 
extensively explain and explore them. 
Just as in the pre-repeal cases, the courts in the post-repeal decisions 
continued to vary as to which administrative and constitutional law 
doctrines were invoked. In addition, even when invoking the same 
principles, in the post-repeal cases differences in how each individual 
doctrine was interpreted and applied began to be discernable. Patterns 
remain extraordinarily difficult to identify, but there are several points of 
note. 
First, the courts again did not apply a very high level of deference to the 
agency. Even in those decisions that ultimately agreed with the agency’s 
position, the courts did not spend a great deal of time identifying or 
discussing the doctrine of deference they were applying. They primarily 
undertook their own detailed analyses of the question independently of the 
agency’s analysis and the factors that the agency considered. 
Administrative law doctrines of deference were also used by the courts to 
overturn agency positions, most notably by the Supreme Court in 
Judulang.387 
Second, as some more detailed discussions of the administrative and 
constitutional law principles occurred in the case law, the radical 
differences between circuits—and even within a single circuit—in 
interpreting and applying those doctrines became even more apparent. For 
example, when should APA arbitrary and capricious review be triggered 
instead of Chevron deference? Should equal protection and other 
constitutional questions be subsumed within step two of Chevron or the 
                                                                                                                 
 386. See, e.g., Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress has particularly 
broad and sweeping powers when it comes to immigration, and is therefore entitled to an 
additional measure of deference when it legislates as to admission, exclusion, removal, 
naturalization or other matters pertaining to aliens.”). 
 387. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 54 (2011).  
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arbitrary and capricious analysis? Or should equal protection be treated as a 
stand-alone question? Does the substantive logic of an agency interpretation 
have a role in arbitrary and capricious review or only in Chevron’s 
reasonableness inquiry? Just how deferential should courts be when 
assessing the arbitrariness, capriciousness, or reasonableness of an agency 
position? 
D. Expansion of 212(h) Waivers to Deportability 
Despite the apparent surface similarities between waivers under the 
former section 212(c) and waivers under 212(h), litigation to expand the 
applicability of 212(h) to waive charges of deportability has taken a very 
different path. It began more slowly, picking up speed only in recent years, 
and has not produced nearly the same volume of cases as the 212(c) 
litigation.388 Perhaps more importantly, these challenges in the 212(h) 
context have reached very different results. Section 212(h), when used 
alone to waive a charge of deportability, unconnected to a prior entry or an 
application to adjust status, is called a stand-alone 212(h) waiver.389 While 
Francis and Silva held unequivocally that a failure to allow stand-alone 
212(c) waivers would be unconstitutional, arguments to expand the 
applicability of 212(h) to this pure stand-alone context have been almost 
exclusively unsuccessful.  
This subpart traces these challenges. Section D.1 covers the initial 
expansion of the availability of 212(h) to waive deportability under some 
circumstances. Section D.2 describes the circuit court cases that halted that 
expansion. Then Section D.3 addresses the BIA’s decision that went further 
to contract the availability of 212(h) for LPRs charged as deportable and its 
aftermath in the circuit courts. The discussion in all three of these sections 
focuses not only on the outcomes of the cases but also on the invocation of 
Congress’ plenary power over immigration and the use of the three legal 
                                                                                                                 
 388. There is no definitive explanation for why 212(h) has historically spawned less 
litigation, but several factors may contribute. Section 212(h) is a narrower form of relief that 
212(c)—it both waives fewer convictions and is more difficult to obtain in may 
circumstances because of the extreme hardship element that does not exist for 212(c). Prior 
to the repeal of 212(c) in 1996, 212(c) was almost always available and preferable when 
212(h) was an option. After 212(c) was repealed, however, there are increasing 
circumstances in which 212(h) will be available and 212(c) (and perhaps even Cancellation 
of Removal) are not. As the importance of 212(h) has grown, questions about 212(h) are 
increasingly frequently litigated. 
 389. See, e.g., Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130 (BIA 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
1414 (2015); Michael Vastine, The Status of Standalone INA § 212(h) Waivers: Can Rivas 
Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny?, 2013 EMERGING ISSUES 7039 (Lexis) (July 19, 2013). 
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frameworks discussed above in the 212(c) context: Chevron deference, 
equal protection, and arbitrary and capricious review under the APA. 
Finally, Section D.4 draws some preliminary conclusions from the 
application of these general constitutional and administrative law 
frameworks in the 212(h) expansion context. Despite the greater uniformity 
in doctrine and outcome for 212(h) as compared to 212(c), the case law 
raises equal, if not greater, questions. 
1. Initial Expansion 
The distinction between 212(c) and 212(h) has not always existed; there 
was a point in time at which it appeared that the expanded application of 
these two separate waivers would proceed along parallel tracks. The BIA 
held in multiple cases that 212(h) waivers were available in deportation 
proceedings nunc pro tunc when the facts that are the basis for deportability 
made the noncitizen inadmissible at the time of his or her last entry.390 The 
Board even discussed and analogized to a 212(c) nunc pro tunc case, Matter 
of Tanori, in this context.391 The Board further held that noncitizens in 
deportation proceedings were eligible for 212(h) waivers in conjunction 
with applications to adjust status.392 None of these decisions discussed 
equal protection or, of course, deference. 
In the 1995 Yeung v. INS case, which involved a request for a stand-
alone 212(h) waiver, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took the 
same step further as the Second Circuit in Francis had in the 212(c) 
context.393 Yeung was an LPR deportable as a noncitizen convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry because of his 
                                                                                                                 
 390. See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218, 222-23 (BIA 1980), overruled by 
Matter of Rivas, 261 I. & N. Dec. 130, 134 (BIA 2013); Matter of Bernabella, 13 I. & N. 
Dec. 42, 43 (BIA 1968); Matter of Mascorro-Perales, 12 I. & N. Dec. 228, 229 (BIA 1967); 
Matter of Millard, 11 I. & N. Dec. 175, 177 (BIA 1965); Matter of P-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 713, 
713 (BIA 1958).  
 391. See Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (citing Matter of Tanori, 15 I. & N. Dec. 566 
(BIA 1976)). 
 392. See, e.g., Matter of Parodi, 17 I. & N. Dec. 608, 611-12 (BIA 1980); Bernabella, 13 
I. & N. Dec. at 43-44. 
 393. 76 F.3d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1995), modified 72 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1996). It does 
not appear that there were any earlier published precedential Board of Immigration Appeals 
decisions ruling one way or the other on the availability of stand-alone 212(h) waivers in 
deportation proceedings outside of the nunc pro tunc and adjustment of status contexts. See 
Yeung v. INS, 72 F.3d 843, 843 (11th Cir. 1996), modifying 76 F.3d 337 (1995) (remanding 
with directions to the Board to reconsider its precedents only in Sanchez, Parodi, and Yeung 
itself); see also Vastine, supra note 389. 
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conviction for attempted manslaughter.394 He needed a stand-alone 212(h) 
waiver because he could not file for adjustment of status, and he had not 
left the United States and returned after his conviction, so he could not 
benefit from the nunc pro tunc waiver allowed under prior case law.395  
The very same equal protection question was raised, then, as was in the 
212(c) cases: can the law distinguish between LPRs who travel outside the 
United States and those who do not? The court held that it could not. It 
applied minimal scrutiny under the rational basis standard of review, and 
found that this distinction between groups “can only be characterized as 
arbitrary” and “is without ‘a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation.’”396 The Eleventh Circuit explicitly found the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Francis, holding the same in the 212(c) context, to be 
analogous.397  
The court did not discuss or apply any kind of deference to the agency’s 
contrary interpretation of the applicability of 212(h) in its initial decision. 
However, on a petition for rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit added a 
paragraph remanding to the BIA with instructions to reconsider its prior 
interpretation of 212(h) in Sanchez, Parodi, and Yeung, “consistent with the 
competing statutory, constitutional, and policy interests at stake.”398 In 
support of this remand with instructions, the Eleventh Circuit cited to 
Chevron.399 By the time the Board issued its decision on remand, however, 
Congress had passed IIRIRA, which made 212(h) unavailable to LPRs who, 
like Yeung, had been convicted of an aggravated felony.400 Because Yeung 
would no longer be eligible for a 212(h) waiver in any event, the Board 
specifically declined to rule on the scope of availability of 212(h) to waive 
charges of deportability.401 
  
                                                                                                                 
 394. Yeung, 76 F.3d at 337. 
 395. Id. at 338; see also, e.g., Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 223. 
 396. Yeung, 76 F.3d at 340 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
(1920)). 
 397. Id. 
 398. Yeung v. INS, 72 F.3d 843, 843 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 399. Id. 
 400. Matter of Yeung, 21 I. & N. Dec. 610, 611-12 (BIA 1996). 
 401. Id. at 612. The Board does not appear to have reconsidered its interpretation of 
212(h) and its position in Sanchez in another case prior to Matter of Rivas. See Poveda v. 
U.S. Att’y General, 692 F.3d 1168, 1181 (11th Cir. 2012) (Martin, J., dissenting); Matter of 
Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 131-34 (BIA 2013). 
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2. Halting the Expansion 
After the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Yeung, 212(c) and 212(h) did not 
continue in the same expansive direction. Unlike after Francis, when the 
Board acted quickly to affirmatively adopt the Second Circuit’s holding 
regarding 212(c) and therefore apply it uniformly throughout the country, 
the Board did not so act in the 212(h) context. Furthermore, no circuit 
courts have agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in Yeung, and several have 
affirmatively disagreed.402  
The Board did, however, initially continue to acknowledge the 
availability of 212(h) for deportable LPRs to waive grounds of 
inadmissibility nunc pro tunc to a prior entry and in conjunction with an 
application to adjust status.403 The Board and the circuit courts cited to 
Sanchez even after Congress constricted the availability of 212(h) for LPRs 
as part of IIRIRA in 1996.404  
a) The Seventh, Fifth, and Third Circuits 
The Seventh Circuit in Klementanovsky v. Gonzales405 and the Fifth 
Circuit in Cabral v. Holder406 declined to expand the Board’s holdings in 
Sanchez and Parodi to allow stand-alone 212(h) waivers. Both courts held 
that denying deportable noncitizens the ability to apply for a 212(h) waiver 
did not violate equal protection because there were multiple potential 
rational reasons for distinguishing “between those criminal aliens who seek 
to be admitted to the United States, and those criminal aliens who are being 
deported from the United States.”407 The Third Circuit in an unpublished 
decision, Montano v. United States Attorney General, agreed.408 Possible 
reasons offered by the three courts included the following:  
Congress might have wanted to ensure that dangerous people, 
including those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, remain 
outside the United States while their applications for 
                                                                                                                 
 402. See KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTRS., UPDATE ON INA § 
212(H) DEFENSE STRATEGIES 19 (2011), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/update_on_ 
ina_212_1.pdf. 
 403. See, e.g., Matter of Loaisiga, No. A28 644 366, 2008 WL 1924655 (BIA Apr. 8, 
2008); see also Vastine, supra note 389. 
 404. See, e.g., Margulis v. Holder, 725 F.3d 785, 787-89 (7th Cir. 2013); Matter of 
Abosi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 204, 206 (BIA 2007). 
 405. 501 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 406. 632 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 407. Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 792; see also Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893. 
 408. 350 Fed. App’x 643 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
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discretionary relief are being considered. Congress might have 
wanted aliens seeking such waivers to do so from outside the 
United States in order to discourage them from attempting to 
“fly under the radar” of the immigration authorities in the event 
that the discretionary waiver is ultimately denied. Congress 
might have rationalized that an alien who self-deports and 
returns through proper admission procedures provides 
immigration authorities a second bite at the apple to intercept 
and consider otherwise unlawful aliens. Congress might have 
rationalized that granting a waiver to those who self-deport and 
seek readmission at the borders provides an incentive for such 
aliens to voluntarily depart at their own expense.409 
Commentators also suggested that the Ninth Circuit, were it to take up 
this issue, would decide in accordance with these three circuits given its 
decision in Abebe withdrawing from the Francis equal protection rationale 
even in the 212(c) context.410 
The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in these three cases focused 
exclusively on equal protection. They did not discuss deference to the 
agency interpretation of 212(h)—Chevron or otherwise—or any 
requirements imposed by the APA. The Fifth Circuit in Cabral attempted to 
distinguish the 212(c) context and the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Francis.411 Despite the factual situations and prior legal histories being 
virtually identical, the Fifth Circuit attempted to describe the groups being 
distinguished between differently than the Second Circuit had done in 
Francis. The Fifth Circuit described the court in Francis as pointing out 
that the distinction at issue was between deportable LPRs who had traveled 
outside the United States and those who had not.412 Factually, this was also 
the case in Cabral, but the court there chose to describe the two groups as 
those who were being deported and those who were being excluded.413 This 
                                                                                                                 
 409. Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 792-93; see also Cabral, 632 F.3d at 892-93; 
Montano, 350 Fed. App’x at 647. 
 410. See Brady, supra note 402, at 19.  
 411. Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94. Cabral appears to have relied on the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Francis rather than the more applicable Board decision in Silva. Id. at 893. The 
Seventh Circuit in Klementanovsky discussed a prior Seventh Circuit case drawing this same 
distinction. 501 F.3d at 793-94 (citing LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 
1998)). 
 412. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 413. Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
176 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:111 
 
 
allowed the Fifth Circuit to analyze differently the possible rational bases 
for Congress’ decision to draw this distinction.  
b) The Eleventh Circuit 
For many years, it appeared that the Eleventh Circuit would stand by its 
decision in Yeung and continue to interpret 212(h) as allowing at least some 
noncitizens to waive their charges of deportability.414 Today, however, even 
the Eleventh Circuit has retreated from Yeung. In a 2012 case called Poveda 
v. United States Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the 
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals that there was no equal 
protection violation as there was a rational basis to distinguish between 
excludable noncitizens’ and deportable noncitizens’ respective eligibility 
for relief under section 212(h).415 The court in Poveda cited to 
Klementanovsky and Cabral and offered the same possible reasonable 
explanations for this distinction.416 
The court in Poveda also went beyond the pure equal protection 
framework of the cases previously discussed to attempt to address a number 
of other issues. First, Poveda stated that the court was not overruling its 
previous decision in Yeung, but instead attempted to distinguish the current 
circumstances from those when Yeung was decided.417 The court explained 
that the Board had previously held that 212(h), like 212(c), was available 
nunc pro tunc to noncitizens who departed the United States after a criminal 
conviction that rendered them inadmissible but had not actually been 
charged with inadmissibility on reentry.418 According to the court, the 
distinction that concerned the courts in Yeung and Francis was between 
those noncitizens charged as deportable who were allowed to request 
waivers nunc pro tunc to their prior entries and those who had not departed 
                                                                                                                 
 414. See Lanier v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.1 (2011). Lanier was a lawful 
permanent resident charged as deportable in removal proceedings as the result of an 
aggravated felony conviction. Id. at 1365. The legal question at issue in the case was 
whether the aggravated felony bar to 212(h) applied to those who adjusted status to lawful 
permanent residence, but the Eleventh Circuit cited Yeung in a footnote in support of the 
statement that 212(h) was available to noncitizens in removal proceedings. Id. at 1364 n.1 
(citing Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1995)). As Lanier was charged as 
deportable, this statement also must have meant available to waive essentially all grounds of 
deportability or the question of the applicability of the aggravated felony bar would have 
been moot. See also Vastine, supra note 389. 
 415. 692 F.3d 1168, 1176-78 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. at 1174. 
 418. Id. 
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the United States and therefore would not be eligible for waivers. The court 
held, however—citing only to the Seventh Circuit decision in 
Klementanovsky and without an on-point citation to Board precedent—that 
the Board had retreated from this position in the 212(h) context and no 
longer believed that 212(h) was available nunc pro tunc.419  
The court also attempted to distinguish the circumstances at issue in 
Yeung from those in Poveda by focusing on the shift in IIRIRA from a 
focus on physical entry into the United States to a focus on lawful 
inspection and admission.420 Under IIRIRA’s new definition of those 
seeking admission, LPRs with criminal convictions who traveled outside 
the country would be deemed to be seeking admission and subject to the 
grounds of inadmissibility.421 Although the court’s decision on this point is 
not entirely clear, it appeared to be saying that continuing to allow nunc pro 
tunc or stand-alone 212(h) waivers would be inconsistent with these 
extensive changes made by Congress.422 Finally, the court briefly tried to 
distinguish 212(h) from the earlier 212(c) cases and the holdings in Francis 
and Silva by quoting from an earlier Eleventh Circuit case defining the two 
groups at issue as being deportable non-citizens and inadmissible non-
citizens rather than two different groups of deportable non-citizens.423 
Ultimately, the court held that there was not the same two groups as in the 
212(c) cases being treated differently and therefore there was no longer an 
equal protection violation.424 The court was essentially drawing the same 
fine line that the Fifth Circuit in Cabral had also somewhat unsuccessfully 
used to try to distinguish the 212(h) context. 
Second, unlike the other circuits in the 212(h) context, the court in 
Poveda discussed and applied Chevron deference.425 The court held at 
Chevron step one that Congress had not spoken clearly.426 It therefore went 
                                                                                                                 
 419. Id. at 1174, 1176. The dissent disagreed on this point in particular, arguing that the 
Board had not abandoned Sanchez and had in fact applied it in Poveda’s own case. Id. at 
1182-85 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 420. Id. at 1174-76 (majority opinion). 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. at 1178 (quoting Chuang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 382 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 
2004)). The Eleventh Circuit both in Poveda and Chuang appears to be operating from the 
misunderstanding that noncitizens charged as excludable or inadmissible will remain outside 
the United States while their exclusion or removal proceedings are conducted. See id.; 
Chuang, 382 F.3d at 1304; cf. Vastine, supra note 389. 
 424. Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1174. 
 425. Id. at 1176-78. 
 426. Id. at 1176. 
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on to consider at Chevron step two whether the agency had acted 
reasonably in its interpretation that 212(h) was not available as a stand-
alone waiver of deportability: “Because section 212(h) is silent about 
whether an alien within our borders may obtain a hardship waiver without 
concurrently applying for an adjustment of status, we must consider 
whether the new interpretation of section 212(h) by the Board is 
reasonable.”427 In two different places in its decision, in discussing the 
Chevron reasonableness inquiry, the Court emphasized the particular level 
of deference due to the executive branch in the immigration context.428 
The court concluded that the Board’s interpretation was in fact 
reasonable.429 Despite its emphasis on deference to the agency’s 
interpretation, much of the discussion on reasonableness focused not on the 
Board’s opinions but on the other circuits’ decisions in Klementanovsky and 
Cabral.430 Klementanovsky’s and Cabral’s equal protection analyses were 
collapsed into the Poveda court’s reasonableness inquiry. It appears as 
though the Eleventh Circuit in Poveda was saying that, if there was a 
rational basis to distinguish between inadmissible and deportable 
noncitizens for purposes of eligibility for 212(h), then the Board’s 
interpretation prohibiting stand-alone 212(h) to waive grounds of 
deportability was reasonable.  
Poveda did not stand for long as the Eleventh Circuit’s only opinion on 
stand-alone 212(h); less than one year later another panel of the Eleventh 
Circuit issued a second decision addressing essentially the same issue in 
Lawal v. United States Attorney General.431 Like Poveda, Lawal was an 
LPR charged as deportable in removal proceedings as the result of criminal 
convictions.432 Following his criminal convictions, Lawal had taken a trip 
outside the United States and was lawfully readmitted some years prior to 
being placed in removal proceedings.433 He argued that, under Sanchez, 
                                                                                                                 
 427. Id. Again, the Eleventh Circuit was not able to cite to a Board decision where the 
Board had announced this new interpretation. Id.; see also Vastine, supra note 389. 
 428. Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1172 (“[J]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is 
especially appropriate in the immigration context.”) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); Id. at 1176 (“The degree of deference is especially great in the field 
of immigration.”) (quoting Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 565 F.3d 805, 809 (11th Cir. 2009)). 
 429. Id. at 1176. 
 430. See id. at 1176-78. 
 431. 710 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Vastine, supra note 389 (“Apparently 
realizing that Poveda was problematic on many counts, the Eleventh Circuit published 
[Lawal] mere months after [Poveda].” (footnote omitted)). 
 432. Lawal, 710 F.3d at 1289. 
 433. Id. 
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because he would have been inadmissible as the result of his criminal 
convictions at the time he was readmitted, he qualified for a nunc pro tunc 
212(h) waiver to waive his grounds of deportability.434 Ultimately, the 
Eleventh Circuit remanded Lawal’s case for the Board to reconsider in light 
of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Poveda and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Judulang.435 
Although the court in Lawal did not so much as mention deference, 
Chevron, or the APA, it discussed the BIA’s decision in Sanchez and 
subsequent cases in detail.436 The court then found that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decisions in Yeung and Poveda called the BIA’s interpretation of 
212(h) in Sanchez into doubt.437 Rather than attempting to unravel that 
conundrum on its own, the Eleventh Circuit remanded Lawal’s case to the 
Board for it to address this question on its own in the first instance, in effect 
indicating deference to the Board’s interpretation.438 Although the panel of 
the Eleventh Circuit in Lawal never explicitly called into question the 
earlier panel’s decision in Poveda, this acknowledgement of the ambiguity 
of the Board’s current position was a significant retreat from the Poveda 
panel’s certainty regarding the Board’s interpretation of 212(h) and its 
reasonableness.439 
With the possible/partial exception of the Eleventh Circuit, all circuits to 
consider the issue in the 212(h) context ultimately reached the exact 
opposite conclusion as in the 212(c) context. These courts held that LPRs 
with certain criminal convictions who depart the United States and are 
seeking readmission may apply for and receive waivers of inadmissibility 
under INA section 212(h). However, an identical LPR who has never left 
the country is prohibited from even seeking such a waiver unless it is in 
conjunction with an application for adjustment of status.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 434. Id. at 1289-91. 
 435. Id. at 1293-94. 
 436. Id. at 1289-91. 
 437. Id. at 1291-92. 
 438. Id. at 1293-94. Unlike the panel in Poveda, the panel in Lawal did not discuss or 
rely on the Seventh and Fifth Circuits’ decisions in Klementanovsky and Cabral. Id. The 
Board does not appear to have issued any published decision on remand in Lawal. Shortly 
after Lawal was remanded, the Board published its decision in Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 130 (BIA 2013). See also Vastine, supra note 389. 
 439. See, e.g., Vastine, supra note 389 (“[Lawal] clearly indicated that the circuit lacked 
the necessary clarity of agency position to rule on the constitutionality and legality of that 
position. thus [sic] effectively overruled the precedential value of [Poveda] by 
acknowledging the need for determination from the BIA.”). 
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3. Contraction 
Not only was the expansion of the availability of 212(h) to waive charges 
of deportability halted, but the BIA affirmatively contracted that 
availability. In Matter of Rivas, the BIA held that INA section 212(h) “does 
not provide for an alien in removal proceedings to obtain a ‘stand alone’ 
waiver without an application for adjustment of status” and “a nunc pro 
tunc waiver should not be available to avoid the requirement that an 
adjustment application must be concurrently filed with the waiver 
request.”440 The Board’s decision was based almost exclusively on an 
interpretation of the language of the statute, particularly the 1996 revisions, 
and congressional intent.441 It held that Congress’ revisions to the INA and 
212(h) in 1990 and 1996 had abrogated its prior decision in Sanchez.442 The 
Board did not discuss deference, except insofar as to say the circuit courts 
had found its approach limiting the availability of 212(h) reasonable, or 
otherwise mention the APA.443 It did not discuss equal protection except to 
note that the use of nunc pro tunc waivers could create equal protection 
issues, as they had in the 212(c) context.444  
Rivas was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which sustained the Board’s 
position for the reasons given by the Board and by the Eleventh Circuit in 
its earlier decision in Poveda.445 The Eleventh Circuit held again that the 
statutory language of the waiver was ambiguous and that the Board’s 
interpretation, now clearly articulated in its decision in Rivas, that 212(h) 
was not available as a stand-alone waiver of grounds of deportability was 
reasonable.446 The Eleventh Circuit first went through clear and relatively 
detailed explanations of the standards for Chevron deference and equal 
                                                                                                                 
 440. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 132-33. 
 441. Id. at 131, 133-34. It is worth noting that the Board does use some odd and 
potentially inconsistent language to discuss and possibly discredit its previous decision in 
Matter of Sanchez in an attempt, it would appear, to justify its position. Id. at 131. The Court 
stated: “Because the respondent [in Sanchez] was not eligible for adjustment of status, the 
Immigration Judge granted the waiver nunc pro tunc. The respondent’s situation is different 
from that of the alien in Sanchez because he does not have a pending application for 
adjustment of status.” Id. Either these two sentences are inconsistent, or they are irrational 
and mean that a noncitizen could escape the issue simply by filing an unfounded application 
to adjust status. 
 442. Id. at 134 (“Our precedent issued prior to the 1990 and 1996 amendments to section 
212(h), including Matter of Sanchez, is therefore no longer valid.”) 
 443. Id. at 132. 
 444. Id. at 133-34. 
 445. Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 446. Id. at 1328. 
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protection review in the immigration context.447 While the court does not 
specifically invoke Congress’ plenary power, it does seem to emphasize its 
own limited role in the immigration context in deference to greater 
legislative and executive power.448 The court also mentioned but did not 
explain its disagreement with Rivas’ argument that the Board’s new 
interpretation of 212(h) “invites arbitrary and capricious agency action,” 
presumably a reference to the APA.449  
The court’s analysis did not precisely track the standards it set out, but 
appears, like Poveda, to focus primarily on the reasonableness inquiry.450 It 
placed great importance on the fact that the Board’s interpretation was 
consistent with the statutory language.451 In addition, just as in Poveda, the 
rational basis analysis appears to have become one factor (and not 
necessarily the most important factor) in determining the reasonableness of 
the agency’s interpretation.452 Throughout the decision, the court heavily 
cited to and relied on its prior decision in Poveda, the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Klementanovsky, and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cabral.453 
No circuit court appears to have seriously questioned the Board’s 
position in Rivas. Unsurprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit (in several 
unpublished opinions) has cited primarily to its own decisions in Poveda 
and Rivas to support reaching the same conclusion: no stand-alone 212(h) 
for LPRs charged as deportable without an application to adjust status.454 
The Third455 and Fifth456 Circuits have done the same without further 
analysis. In an earlier published decision, the Third Circuit may have left 
some minimal room for a challenge to the Board’s interpretation in 
Rivas.457 The court noted in a footnote, without citing to the Board’s 
decision in Rivas, that it was not necessary to reach the availability of 
                                                                                                                 
 447. Id. 
 448. See id. 
 449. Id. at 1329. 
 450. See id. at 1328-30. 
 451. Id. at 1329. 
 452. See id. at 1330. 
 453. Id. at 1328-30. 
 454. See, e.g., Villava v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 591 Fed. App’x 732, 733, 735-36 (11th Cir. 
2014); Alas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 589 Fed. App’x 420, 422-23 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 455. See, e.g., Cameron v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 641 Fed. App’x 139, 142 (3rd Cir. 2016); 
Johnson v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 632 Fed. App’x 728, 730-31 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
 456. See, e.g., McMaster v. Holder, 587 Fed. App’x 826, 829 (5th Cir. 2014); Zhong Qin 
Yang v. Holder, 570 Fed. App’x 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2014). Both decisions also cite to Cabral 
v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 891-92 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 457. See Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 783 F.3d 478, 483 n.8 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
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stand-alone 212(h) waivers, and it was therefore declining “to address this 
question in a precedential opinion at this time.”458  
The Sixth Circuit briefly discussed the Board’s interpretation and held in 
a single sentence in an unpublished decision: “Grounded in the statutory 
text and legitimate equal protection concerns, the BIA's interpretation of the 
INA is plainly reasonable and entitled to deference.”459 The Seventh 
Circuit, in a case argued before the Board’s decision in Rivas was published 
but issued after, left some room to challenge the Board’s new interpretation 
abrogating its position in Sanchez: “As the overruling was based on a 
statutory interpretation, there may be room for argument to a reviewing 
court that the Rivas decision is erroneous.”460 Relatively quickly, however, 
the Seventh Circuit upheld the Board’s decision in Rivas without discussion 
of its merits.461 
Only the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Board’s decision in Rivas in any 
level of detail in the case of Mtoched v. Lynch.462 The court first laid out the 
Board’s interpretation as articulated in a DOJ regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 
1245.1(f), and in its decision in Rivas that a noncitizen in the United States 
may apply for a 212(h) waiver only in conjunction with an application to 
adjust status.463 Then the court articulated the standard for Chevron 
deference.464 It held that 212(h) was part of a statutory scheme that the 
Attorney General was expressly charged to administer.465 Although it did 
not specifically so state, it apparently found that 212(h) was ambiguous at 
Chevron step one, as the majority of its discussion was focused on the 
                                                                                                                 
 458. Id.  
 459. Sellers v. Lynch, 630 Fed. App’x 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Palma-Martinez v. 
Lynch, 785 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 2015); Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 
1329-30 (11th Cir. 2014)); see also Fayzullina v. Holder, 777 F.3d 807, 816 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“In any event, the nunc pro tunc waiver concept that was acknowledged for different 
purposes in those cases has since been definitively repudiated by the BIA.”). 
 460. Margulis v. Holder, 725 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 461. Palma-Martinez, 785 F.3d at 1149-50. The Seventh Circuit also cited to and relied 
heavily on its own decision in Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2007). 
Id. at 1149. 
 462. 786 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Garcia v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 789, 
793 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing the Board’s decision in Rivas favorably without further 
discussion); Ramirez v. Holder, 556 Fed. App’x 613, 614 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing the Board’s 
decision in Rivas favorably without further discussion). 
 463. Mtoched, 786 F.3d at 1217. The Court also noted that this interpretation had been 
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Rivas, the Fifth Circuit in Cabral, and the Seventh Circuit 
in Klementanovsky. Id. at 1217-18. 
 464. Id. at 1218. 
 465. Id. 
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reasonableness of the agency interpretation at Chevron step two.466 The 
court relied heavily on the fact that the Board’s interpretation was 
consistent across both the regulation and its decision in Rivas and with the 
statutory language.467 Although the court was focused on Chevron and did 
not discuss the APA, it emphasized (without much discussion) Chevron’s 
statement that an agency’s interpretation was reasonable if not arbitrary or 
capricious.468 The Ninth Circuit’s decision contained no discussion of equal 
protection or of any similarities or dissimilarities with 212(c) waivers. 
This agreement, at least on outcome, and apparent lack of controversy 
over virtually ending 212(h)’s availability to waive grounds of deportability 
is somewhat surprising given the opposite outcome in the 212(c) cases and 
the apparent conflict of the courts’ decisions with the Supreme Court’s 
language in Judulang. Some commentators predicted after the Rivas 
decision that it would not stand,469 but given the length of time that has now 
passed and the lack of serious court attention to challenges, that outcome 
now seems less likely. Just as in the 212(c) context, however, unanswered 
questions about other aspects of 212(h) triggering possible application of 
constitutional and administrative law doctrines remain.470 
4. 212(h): Preliminary Conclusions 
Several of the circuit court cases on the applicability of 212(h) to 
grounds of deportability specifically referenced Congress’ plenary power in 
the immigration context.471 Many of these references were in the context of 
                                                                                                                 
 466. See id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
 469. See, e.g., Vastine, supra note 389 (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to rationalize the 
BIA’s conclusion without instinctively concluding that the distinction in treatment based on 
travel is even less intellectually sound than the § 212(c) scheme pilloried by the Supreme 
Court in Judulang, particularly since the roots of Judulang are in an unfavorable critique of 
§ 212(c) cases that explicitly discriminated against applicants on the basis of foreign travel. 
It is overstatement to declare Judulang a ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over the BIA’s § 
212(h) holding, but Judulang is evidence that the BIA’s logic in determining eligibility for § 
212(h) will be subject to significant (and likely caustic) scrutiny.”). 
 470. See generally Julianne Lee, Note, Tortured Language: Lawful Permanent Residents 
and the 212(h) Waiver, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1201 (2015) (discussing the BIA and circuit 
court split on the applicability of the aggravated felony bar in 212(h) to lawful permanent 
residents who adjusted their status in the United States as opposed to entering as lawful 
permanent residents). 
 471. See, e.g., Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 339 (11th Cir. 1995); Cabral v. Holder, 632 
F.3d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 2011); Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1177 (11th Cir. 
2012).  
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justifying the application of only minimal scrutiny to equal protection 
violations.472 The BIA in Matter of Yeung also referred to Congress’ 
“almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in 
this country.”473 Rather than truly being an expression of the limited powers 
of the courts in the immigration context, these references appear to be more 
of a justification for the approach the court was taking in that particular 
case. The Board’s invocation of Congress’ power was particularly self-
serving, as it was trying to justify departing from its own precedent in 
Sanchez through relying on revisions made by Congress to the INA in 
IIRIRA. 
Just as in the 212(c) context, the circuit courts did not hesitate to invoke 
general principles of constitutional and administrative law in the 212(h) 
context. Virtually all of the decisions turned on either equal protection 
rational basis review or Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of 
212(h). Only the Eleventh Circuit in Lawal even alluded to the possible 
applicability of the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review, although 
Judulang in the 212(c) context was decided by the Supreme Court using 
that framework prior to many of the later 212(h) decisions.474 While the 
application of these doctrines was, if anything, even more entrenched in the 
212(h) than the 212(c) cases, the 212(h) cases did not result in the same in-
depth discussions of the doctrines.  
The 212(h) cases were considerably more uniform than the 212(c) cases 
as to which administrative and constitutional law doctrines were invoked. 
The earlier 212(h) cases turned primarily on the courts’ equal protection 
rational basis review,475 while Poveda and the other later cases incorporated 
more reliance on Chevron deference. Given the less extensive discussion of 
the doctrines in the 212(h) cases, fewer differences in how each individual 
doctrine was interpreted and applied were discernable. In fact, the cases 
converged on each other to a somewhat remarkable degree; cross citation 
                                                                                                                 
 472. See, e.g., Yeung, 76 F.3d at 339; see also Cabral, 632 F.3d at 892; Poveda, 692 F.3d 
at 1177. 
 473. Matter of Yeung, 21 I. & N. Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1996). 
 474. Lawal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 710 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme 
Court, however, has recently struck down the BIA's comparable grounds rule as arbitrary 
and capricious. Accordingly, on remand, the BIA is also to reconsider Lawal's case in light 
of the Supreme Court's holding in Judulang.” (citation omitted)). The Board of Immigration 
Appeals in Rivas also cited to Judulang, but without any reference to the APA or arbitrary 
and capricious review. Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 133 (BIA 2013). 
 475. Yeung is the only one of the earlier cases to so much as mention deference, and then 
only in a brief paragraph in a revised decision. See Yeung, 76 F.3d at 341. 
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was common across circuits to the point that the courts’ reasoning became 
circular in some instances.476 
Several patterns are notable. First, prior to the Board’s decision in Rivas, 
the courts did not apply a very high level of deference to the agency. Even 
within a framework of deference, the courts undertook their own detailed 
analyses of the question independently of the agency’s analysis and the 
factors that the agency had considered. This is even more remarkable than 
in the 212(c) context, given the fact that virtually all of the courts in the 
212(h) context agreed with the Board’s interpretation. 
Second, even absent the radical differences between and within circuits 
in interpreting and applying administrative and constitutional law 
principles, extremely significant gaps in the discussion are nevertheless 
(further) revealed in the 212(h) context. Despite the overall convergence on 
which principles should be applied under which circumstances, the courts 
completely fail to discuss their rationale for why those choices are being 
made, leaving many difficult questions unanswered. For example, why did 
the early circuit court decisions employ only rational basis review even 
when an agency interpretation of the provision at issue existed? What 
constitutes an agency interpretation that would trigger Chevron deference? 
Is APA arbitrary and capricious review rather than Chevron deference ever 
appropriate in the 212(h) context? When and why?  
In addition, there are significant holes in the discussion of the substantive 
standards themselves and what they mean. As in the 212(c) context, many 
courts that considered both equal protection and Chevron deference in the 
212(h) context collapsed the constitutional question into Chevron’s step-
two reasonableness inquiry. What is the proper place for equal protection 
and other constitutional questions? Just how deferential should courts be 
when assessing the arbitrariness, capriciousness, or reasonableness of an 
agency position? Little guidance is offered in selecting and applying the 
appropriate framework(s) for future decision-makers facing the same or 
different circumstances. 
III. Explanations and Implications 
It should be abundantly clear from the above discussion in Part II just 
what a tangled mess the case law is with respect to the expansion of 212(c) 
and 212(h) waivers to grounds of deportability. Despite dealing with a 
relatively narrow, closely related subset of immigration law questions—an 
already very specialized area—we face multi-layered, seeming inexplicable 
                                                                                                                 
 476. See also, e.g., Vastine, supra note 389. 
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inconsistencies in outcomes, choice of legal framework, and analysis within 
a chosen framework. Section III.A argues that these decisions cannot be 
reconciled at the level of outcome, doctrine, or theory.  
Despite being irreconcilable, the decisions do illustrate something 
important about immigration law and its intersection with administrative 
and constitutional law. There are significant parallels in the courts’ analyses 
regardless of which of the three legal frameworks—Chevron deference, 
APA arbitrary and capricious review, and equal protection rational basis 
analysis—is employed. The factors that courts consider and the weight that 
they give to those factors are substantially similar whether the court is 
determining if the agency’s action is reasonable at Chevron step two, if the 
agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious under the APA, or if a statutory 
distinction is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Section 
III.B.1 highlights these parallels from the discussion of the case law in Part 
II.  
Section III.B.2 discusses the significance of these parallels to our 
understanding of immigration law and its relationship to administrative and 
constitutional law today. They reveal the uneasy relationships that 
originated in the theory of immigration exceptionalism and have always 
existed among the courts, the executive branch, and Congress in the 
immigration context. The theory of immigration exceptionalism has clearly 
eroded, as evidenced in the courts’ consistent and unquestioning application 
of these constitutional and administrative law principles. At the same time, 
remnants of the theory still appear to be creating a certain tension in the 
courts’ decisions regarding the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h). Although 
administrative and constitutional doctrines are being applied, the 
explanation of what these doctrines mean and how they apply in the 
immigration law context has been stunted. Detailed development of these 
questions will be an important next step if the theory of immigration 
exceptionalism is to continue to erode. 
A. Irreconcilable Differences 
The currently applicable rules on the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h) to 
waive deportability for LPRs can be summarized at the most basic level of 
generality. As detailed in Part II, the agency and courts have reached 
essentially opposite conclusions in the two contexts. The former section 
212(c) is available to waive all grounds of deportability except those 
corresponding to a ground of inadmissibility specifically excluded in the 
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statutory language.477 Section 212(h), on the other hand, may never be used 
as a stand-alone waiver of deportability, including nunc pro tunc; it may 
only be used to overcome deportability in conjunction with an application 
to adjust status.478 Section III.A.1 argues that these different outcomes are 
not reconcilable; 212(c) and 212(h) cannot be meaningfully distinguished 
with respect to their applicability to deportation. 
Part II also illustrated clearly that the 212(c) and 212(h) cases differ not 
only in outcome but also in their choice of legal framework and analysis 
within a chosen framework. Section III.A.2 will argue that the use of 
doctrine or theory cannot help to reconcile these legal frameworks and 
analyses in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases. 
1. Sections 212(c) and 212(h) Are Not Distinguishable 
While the Board in Sanchez479 and the Eleventh Circuit in Yeung480 
specifically analogized to 212(c) in cases dealing with 212(h), the later 
agency and court opinions all agreed that 212(h) and 212(c) were somehow 
different. Many decisions in the 212(h) expansion cases ignored the 
obvious similarities with 212(c) and simply reached the opposite conclusion 
without even attempting to distinguish 212(h) from 212(c).481 Those courts 
that did try to differentiate 212(h) relied primarily on an argument related to 
the equal protection analysis: courts attempted to define the similarly 
situated groups differently for 212(h).482 When examined more closely, this 
argument cannot stand. Despite these courts’ efforts, there is no way to 
meaningfully distinguish between the applicability of 212(c) and 212(h) 
waivers to grounds of deportability. 
The 212(h) opinions described the court in Francis as being concerned 
with the distinction being made between two different groups of deportable 
LPRs: those who had traveled outside the United States and those who had 
                                                                                                                 
 477. See Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 265-66 (BIA 2014). 
 478. See Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 132-33. 
 479. Matter of Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218, 223 (BIA 1980) (citing Matter of Tanori, 
15 I. & N. Dec. 566 (BIA 1976)). 
 480. Yeung, 76 F.3d at 340-41. 
 481. See generally Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2014); Montano v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 350 Fed. App’x 643 (3rd Cir. 2009); Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130. 
 482. See generally Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1177 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Chuang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 382 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2004) and LaGuerre 
v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998)); Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 893-94 (5th 
Cir. 2011); Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 
LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041. 
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not.483 The courts in the 212(h) cases, on the other hand, chose to describe 
the two groups as those who were being deported and those who were being 
excluded.484 Although this may be a technically accurate description of 
what the Second Circuit in Francis said, it is a false distinction because it 
misses an important point.  
The court in Francis and the Board in Silva were actually concerned with 
the very same two groups as the courts in the 212(h) cases: LPRs with 
criminal convictions who had traveled outside the country and LPRs with 
criminal convictions who had not. In Francis and the other pre-1996 cases, 
LPRs in the first group who had traveled outside the country could still be 
charged as deportable on their return.485 In the post-1996 212(h) cases, 
these very same LPRs would be charged as inadmissible because of 
changes made by IIRIRA to the definition of who is seeking admission.486 
To repeat, the members of the first group are identical in the 212(c) and 
212(h) contexts. For purposes of equal protection, whether a group is in fact 
similarly situated, or whether Congress had a rational basis for singling that 
group out for disparate treatment, cannot turn solely on how that group is 
described.487 
                                                                                                                 
 483. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1976); see, e.g., Poveda, 692 F.3d at 
1177; Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94; Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 793-94. 
 484. See, e.g., Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Chuang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 382 F.3d 
1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2004) and LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 
1998)); Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94; Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 793-94 (citing LaGuerre, 
164 F.3d at 1041). 
 485. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (amended 1996); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 
374 U.S. 449, 452, (1963); see also Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1175 (11th 
Cir. 2012). Entry without inspection was also a ground of deportability pre-1996 but is now 
a ground of inadmissibility. Compare INA § 241(a)(1)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(ii) 
(amended and transferred 1996) (making being present in the United States after having 
entered without inspection a ground of deportability) with INA § 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182 (a)(6)(A) (2012) (making being present in the U.S. after having entered without 
inspection a ground of inadmissibility). 
 486. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012); Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
301(a)(13)(C)(v), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); see also Lawal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 710 F.3d 1288, 
1291-92 (11th Cir. 2013); Aschenbrenner, supra note 118, at 169-70. 
 487. Furthermore, it is somewhat difficult to argue that Congress had a rational basis for 
delineating the division between the grounds of inadmissibility and the grounds of 
deportability in the first instance. There is illogicality in the grounds of deportability and 
inadmissibility themselves. Why are aggravated felonies, or firearms offenses, or crimes of 
domestic violence grounds of deportability but not grounds of inadmissibility? See INA § 
101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012); INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2012); INA § 
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This distinction between the 212(h) and 212(c) context seems almost 
pretextual, as though the courts wanted to reach a different conclusion in 
the 212(h) context and were looking for a justification to do so. Because 
212(c) is now available only retroactively to waive convictions occurring 
prior to IIRIRA, 212(c) cases are likely to eventually taper off over time. 
Section 212(h), however, remains available to waive current and future 
convictions. The courts may have been trying to avoid the plethora of 
litigation and complexities that have characterized 212(c) in an ongoing 
context like 212(h). 
Courts and commentators may also argue that 212(c) is a special, 
peculiar context, and should not be used to draw deductions applicable to 
other immigration law issues, such as 212(h). Section 212(c) cases 
necessarily involve the intersection of not only immigration law but also 
complex questions of retroactivity, equal protection, and administrative 
law. It is highly tempting to dismiss this area of law as an aberration, a 
highly technical wrinkle driven by the overlap of several areas of long-past, 
and possibly mistaken, precedent in the already complex morass of 
immigration law. Indeed, once the 212(c) cases are removed from the 
analysis in Part II above, the 212(h) cases viewed alone appear at first blush 
much more consistent and less problematic. Considering, given the repeal 
of 212(c), 212(c) claims will eventually no longer arise, what would be the 
harm in simply writing off this area for purposes of future analysis? Under 
this theory, the inconsistencies are in fact irreconcilable, but it does not 
matter because the 212(c) context is aberrational.  
Many of the courts hearing these cases would seem likely to agree with 
this diagnosis. The First Circuit described “the combined effect of § 212(c) 
and the interpretation in Francis and its aftermath” as “an untidy 
patchwork, even, one might say, a mess.”488 The Second Circuit highlighted 
                                                                                                                 
237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012). Arguments can and have been made in 
support of this of course, including the fact that those charged as deportable have violated a 
trust or opportunity and may have caused harm inside the United States. Considered at the 
most basic level, however, how can this be rational? If a criminal offense is considered to be 
“bad” enough to deport someone, how can it not be “bad” enough to warrant keeping 
someone out of the country in the first place? The movement of individuals from one 
category to another, such as those who entered without inspection could also support an 
argument against rationality. Compare INA § 241(a)(1)(C)(ii),8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(ii) 
(amended and transferred 1996) (making being present in the U.S. after having entered 
without inspection a ground of deportability) with INA § 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1186(a)(6)(A) (2012) (making being present in the U.S. after having entered without 
inspection a ground of inadmissibility). 
 488. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 315 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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the inherent complexities by beginning their opinion in Blake with the 
following sentence: “At issue is a judicial amendment to an unconstitutional 
statute now repealed.”489 Even the Supreme Court expressed similar 
sentiments during oral argument in Judulang. Justice Breyer described it as 
an “arcane area of the law,”490 and Justice Ginsburg described the cases as 
“a very confusing set of decisions.”491 Justice Alito described a particular 
circumstance caused by the 212(c) cases as “bizarre.”492 Justice Kennedy 
asked at one point if the Court had to “just say we're in this wilderness and 
we can't get out?”493 
Despite its admitted complexity, and these strong sentiments from the 
courts, 212(c) cannot be so easily dismissed as an aberration. Section 
212(c) and the case law interpreting it are not such a departure from the 
more typical context that they cannot be used to make general deductions 
and predictions. This is most clear by looking at the stark similarity of the 
issues discussed in the 212(h) context above. It is also illustrated by the fact 
that the Supreme Court has heard multiple cases in the 212(c) context;494 
this would have been unlikely to occur had the Court not understood these 
questions as having broader implications and applicability.495 In fact, the 
Supreme Court has substantively cited its 212(c) cases in other contexts.496 
Furthermore, the complexity of the questions presented can be a benefit, as 
it highlights potential issues with the doctrine as seen in the discussion of 
the case law above. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 489. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 90 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
 490. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 491. Id. at 15. 
 492. Id. at 17. 
 493. Id. at 18. 
 494. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Judulang, 565 U.S. 42. 
 495. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c) (providing reasons that the Supreme Court may consider in 
determining whether to grant certiorari); Margaret Meriweather Cordray & Richard Cordray, 
The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case 
Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 391 (2004) (analyzing “the gatekeeping choices that the 
Justices make as they set the direction in which the Court will proceed”). 
 496. See, e.g., Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2015 (2012) (citing 
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. at 45-49); Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1484-85 (2012) 
(citing Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45-48); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1176 (2012) 
(citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001)); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363 (2010) 
(citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 296); Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 19 (2008) (citing St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. at 320); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez, 548 U.S. 30, 43 (2006) (citing St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. at 289). 
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2. Doctrine and Theory Cannot Help to Reconcile 212(c) and 212(h) 
If the 212(c) and 212(h) expansion cases cannot be reconciled on their 
face, then the next question is whether some doctrine or theory can be 
applied to reconcile them now or for the future. This section considers 
whether immigration exceptionalism, Chevron deference, or ABA arbitrary 
and capricious review may provide an explanation for—or better yet a way 
out of—the current morass. I ultimately conclude that these doctrines and 
theory also do not help to reconcile the 212(c) and 212(h) cases, although 
some may help point to a way forward.  
a) Immigration Exceptionalism? 
First, the utility of a theory of immigration exceptionalism in this context 
is easily rejected. It may explain differences in doctrine and application 
between immigration law and other areas of the law, but as previously 
discussed, commentators are now questioning whether or not even these 
differences really continue to exist.497 In any event, a theory that 
immigration law differs from other specialty areas of law certainly does not, 
or should not be allowed to, explain discrepancies and confusion within 
immigration law. Furthermore, even if one accepts the premise that 
Congress has plenary power over immigration, it cannot explain why courts 
should have essentially unrestrained discretion to act in the immigration 
context, as sometimes seems to have occurred in the 212(c) and 212(h) 
cases.  
b) Chevron as Explanation or Savior? 
A second possibility is that looking closely at the role of Chevron can 
explain what is going on in these cases. At first blush, this is an appealing 
theory. The initial cases regarding the expansion of 212(c) to the 
deportability context, Francis and Silva, were decided prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chevron, while the cases regarding the expansion of 
212(h) to waive deportability were decided after.498 Although deference to 
agency action was not nonexistent prior to Chevron, it was not nearly as 
                                                                                                                 
 497. See generally LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 18, at 220-22; Aleinikoff, supra 
note 19, at 34; Johnson, supra note 6; Kagan, supra note 17; Legomsky, supra note 5, at 
930-37; Motomura, supra note 7, at 1372-73; Motomura, supra note 6, at 574-600; 
Rosenbloom, supra note 12, at 1983 n.129 (“A number of scholars have chronicled the 
emergence of cracks in the plenary power doctrine over the decades.”); Spiro, supra note 16, 
at 341-45. 
 498. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976). 
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clearly articulated or established as it became in Chevron’s aftermath.499 
Perhaps the application of Chevron deference in the 212(h) cases and not 
the 212(c) cases could somehow explain the opposite outcomes reached in 
those two sets of decisions. This explanation could, in theory, be related to 
the circuit courts’ greater freedom and authority to decide constitutional 
issues; to the respective likelihoods of the courts and the agency to reach 
decisions favorable to the noncitizen respondent; or to some other factor 
related to or arising out of the exercise of Chevron deference. 
Despite its potential appeal, this theory ultimately proves untrue as a 
factual matter. First, Chevron was only invoked in three of the pre-Rivas 
212(h) cases.500 In the others, there was no indication that the Court was 
deferring to the agency’s decision.501 Therefore, it is unlikely that Chevron 
could be the explanation for the different outcomes reached. Second, the 
cases considering which grounds of deportability could be waived by 
212(c) leading up to Judulang demonstrate that the application of Chevron 
is not nearly so straightforward. Even when invoked, Chevron can be 
interpreted and applied in a variety of ways and therefore does not 
necessarily result in a particular or consistent outcome. Furthermore, the 
pre-Judulang 212(c) decisions demonstrated a fair amount of discrepancy 
and seeming randomness with respect to when the courts invoked Chevron 
in the first instance, thereby giving the invocation of Chevron little 
predictive or explanatory power.  
Even if Chevron cannot explain the existing incoherence, perhaps 
clarifying the application of Chevron can fix the inconsistency moving 
forward. Multiple possible Chevron critiques and fixes have been proposed 
in various contexts. One fix focuses on the role of constitutional avoidance 
in the Chevron two-step test. Commentators have long suggested that 
constitutional avoidance is a canon of statutory interpretation that should be 
applied to interpret the statute at Chevron step one.502 This follows logically 
                                                                                                                 
 499. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 13, at 1681; Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 6-9. 
 500. See Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014); Poveda v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1176-78 (11th Cir. 2012); Yeung v. INS, 72 F.3d 843, 843 (11th 
Cir. 1996); cf. Lawal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 710 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013) (not mentioning 
deference or Chevron, but remanding for the Board to clarify their interpretation of 212(h)). 
 501. Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 2011); Montano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
350 Fed. App’x 643 (3rd Cir. 2009); Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 792 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
 502. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of 
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (“A majority, including the 
Supreme Court, argues that courts should continue to interpret legislation independently 
when normative canons would apply, even when Congress has charged a particular agency 
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both from the nature of step one (to determine what the statute says and 
whether it is unambiguous)503 and from the fact that administrative agencies 
like the BIA have only limited jurisdiction over constitutional issues.504 If 
an agency cannot ultimately decide and has no expertise in constitutional 
issues, perhaps it does not make sense to defer to that agency’s 
interpretation of a statute with constitutional implications. Focusing the 
identification and resolution of constitutional issues at step one would avoid 
having to ask this difficult question at step two.  
Alternatively, courts could clarify that the analysis of whether a 
particular interpretation triggers constitutional issues should block the 
application of Chevron deference altogether505 or should happen during 
Chevron’s step two reasonableness inquiry.506 A position that questionable 
constitutional issues should take adjudication outside the scope of Chevron 
                                                                                                                 
with the statute’s administration.”); cf. Cox, supra note 13, at 1672-79 (arguing that judicial 
skepticism of agency decisions may reflect the position that certain types of decisions, such 
as statutes raising potential constitutional issues, are better left to Congress than to 
administrative agencies). But see Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 607-09 (“The 
relationship between Chevron and these other interpretive tools raises a host of difficult and 
important issues, yet judges and scholars are sometimes distracted by the question whether 
this or that interpretive tool ought to come into play at Step One or Step Two, instead of 
focusing on the real questions.”). 
 503. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 504. Matter of Fitzpatrick, 26 I. & N. Dec. 559, 562 (BIA 2015) (“[W]e have no 
authority to rule on the constitutionality of the laws enacted by Congress.”); Matter of 
Fuentes-Campos, 21 I. & N. Dec. 905, 912 (BIA 1997) (“It is well settled that we lack 
jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations we administer.”); 
Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“[I]t is settled that the immigration 
judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the 
regulations.”). 
 505. See, e.g., Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory 
Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 191-96 (2015); 
Slocum, supra note 31, at 546 (“One clear statement canon that seems to clearly displace 
Chevron deference is the constitutional question avoidance canon, which directs that ‘if an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, 
and where an alternative interpretation of a statute is “fairly possible,” . . . [reviewing courts] 
are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.’”(alterations in original)); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000) (describing the 
canon of constitutional avoidance as trumping Chevron on the theory that Congress, not the 
agency, must choose to raise constitutionally sensitive questions). 
 506. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 502, at 68 (arguing that normative canons such as 
constitutional avoidance should be applied in a contextual inquiry as part of the 
reasonableness assessment at Chevron step two); Slocum, supra note 31, at 573-82 (arguing 
that the immigration rule of lenity, another canon of statutory construction, should be 
employed as part of Chevron step two). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
194 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:111 
 
 
deference would place constitutional considerations even more squarely 
within the control of the courts and Congress. Placing the inquiry at 
Chevron step two, on the other hand, would give the agency some voice on 
constitutional questions. Under this approach, if an agency’s legal 
interpretation is unconstitutional, or perhaps even merely presents 
constitutional issues, the courts would find that agency position 
unreasonable. This is in fact what many of the courts appear to have done in 
the 212(c) and 212(h) contexts, but without explicitly so stating or 
explaining why they chose to address constitutional issues at step two rather 
than step one. For purposes of this discussion, exactly where the 
constitutional consideration—here, equal protection—comes into play is 
less important than clarity on what is occurring and why. Explicit 
articulation and consideration in the case law of the role of equal protection 
in or outside of Chevron deference, even if there is disagreement among 
courts, should eventually lead to greater uniformity and predictability. 
A second solution focuses on Chevron step zero: determining whether 
Chevron is triggered in the first instance.507 This inquiry can involve 
multiple questions, including whether the agency is interpreting a statute it 
is charged with administering, whether the agency position takes a form 
that merits deference from the courts, and whether Chevron or some other 
standard of deference is most appropriate.508 Clarifying the standard for 
determining when Chevron does or does not apply would do much to avoid 
the distortion of the standard and the confusion that has resulted in the 
212(c) and 212(h) contexts.  
Clarifying the application of Chevron in all respects as a means of 
reconciling inconsistencies in the 212(c) and 212(h) contexts, and even in 
other aspects of immigration law, has significant merit for all the reasons 
discussed above. Alone, however, it could not resolve the inconsistencies 
and incoherence surrounding 212(c) and 212(h) and their expansion to 
waive grounds of deportability. The 212(h) cases turn in significant part on 
the fact that the courts found no equal protection concerns, holding in most 
cases that there were multiple rational reasons for treating noncitizens 
seeking admission differently than noncitizens facing deportation. Even the 
most perfect and complete Chevron fix, then, could not rationalize the 
opposite outcomes in 212(c) and 212(h) cases. Chevron, equal protection, 
and other administrative procedures are profoundly interconnected, at least 
                                                                                                                 
 507. See generally Holper, supra note 30; Sunstein, supra note 30. 
 508. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All 
These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 741-50 (2014); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 33, at 
1098-120. 
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in this immigration context. I argue in Section III.B below that these 
interconnections must be fully considered both for the 212(c) and 212(h) 
problem and for the future of immigration law more generally. 
c) Judulang as Savior? 
If Chevron cannot reconcile the 212(c) and 212(h) mess, perhaps 
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA can. Some commentators 
have presented the Supreme Court’s opinion in Judulang as not only a 
recognition of the problem but also a wakeup call for the agency.509 This 
theory is also very appealing. The Court used strong language in Judulang 
to criticize the arbitrariness of the Board’s interpretation of 212(c) in Blake 
and Brieva.510 The decision has been seen as a warning to the agency that it 
must provide reasoned, rational explanations for its legal interpretations or 
the federal courts will overturn them under the APA.511  
There is some indication that the Board has received this message. The 
Board’s opinion in Matter of Abdelghany, announcing its new interpretation 
for when 212(c) will be available to waive charges of deportability after the 
old rule was abrogated in Judulang, is twenty pages long.512 The Board 
explained at length the various possible alternative rules it considered and 
why it rejected them.513 The Board then clearly stated what the rule will be 
moving forward.514 The Board went even further, however, and attempted 
to clarify its position on other remaining questions regarding eligibility for 
212(c) relief in an effort to provide a comprehensive and definitive 
resolution.515 But in other contexts—for example the Board’s recent 
opinion in Matter of Rivas taking away the ability for noncitizens charged 
as deportable to be granted stand-alone 212(h) relief nunc pro tunc to a 
prior entry—the same lack of clarity and rationality still creep in.516 
Even if the agency perfectly heeds Judulang’s call for clarity and 
rationality, however, it will not be sufficient to solve the problems 
                                                                                                                 
 509. See, e.g., Glen, supra note 69, at 2; Kevin Johnson, Opinion Analysis: Judulang v. 
Holder, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 13, 2011, 10:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/ 
opinion-analysis-judulang-v-holder/. 
 510. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53-63 (2011). 
 511. See, e.g., Glen, supra note 69, at 2; Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How 
Judulang Limits Executive Immigration Policymaking Authority and Opens Channels for 
Future Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 37 (2012). 
 512. Matter of Abdelgheny, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014). 
 513. Id. at 261-65. 
 514. Id. at 265-66. 
 515. Id. at 266-72. 
 516. Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130 (BIA 2013). 
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identified above. As should be obvious from the circuit court decisions 
discussed here, the courts of appeals are easily as much, if not more of, an 
issue than the agency itself. It is the decisions of the courts of appeals that 
have contributed most significantly to the inconsistencies, errors, and 
inexplicability of the 212(c)/212(h) context. Furthermore, as discussed 
above in relation to Chevron, arbitrary and capricious review, Chevron 
deference, and equal protection are all profoundly interconnected in these 
cases. Any comprehensive solution must also consider these relationships. 
B. Summary and Significance of the Parallels 
The fact that the 212(c) and 212(h) decisions cannot be explained or 
reconciled at the level of outcome, doctrine, or theory leads to some 
important insights regarding immigration exceptionalism, immigration law 
today, and immigration law’s intersection with administrative and 
constitutional law. The application of ordinary administrative and 
constitutional law principles—specifically Chevron deference, arbitrary and 
capricious review, and equal protection rational basis analysis—by the 
courts deciding the 212(c) and 212(h) cases demonstrates a clear, 
continuing erosion of the plenary power doctrine. Analyzing the application 
of these principles further, there are significant parallels in the courts’ 
analyses regardless of which of the three legal frameworks are employed. 
Assessing whether an agency’s legal interpretation is reasonable under step 
two of the Chevron analysis looks a great deal like analyzing whether an 
agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious under section 706(2)(A) of the 
APA, which in turn looks a great deal like considering whether there is a 
rational basis for a particular action under minimal scrutiny equal protection 
review. Section III.B.1 explores the historical roots of these parallels and 
draws attention to their occurrence in the case law from Part II. 
Courts have only extremely rarely noted these parallels and have never 
analyzed their significance. This failure is one facet of a larger issue: the 
courts in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases have primarily engaged in only a 
surface application of the constitutional and administrative law principles 
discussed. Section III.B.2 argues that the fact that these courts have not 
engaged in a deeper analysis of the intersection of these principles or 
attempted to answer the remaining questions regarding these doctrines 
highlighted throughout this article is a remnant of plenary power and 
immigration law exceptionalism. Deeper attempts to explain what these 
doctrines mean, when and how they apply in the immigration law context, 
and how they interconnect will be the next step in the erosion of 
immigration exceptionalism. 
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1. Summary of the Parallels 
Considering the immigration, constitutional, and administrative law 
tracks simultaneously shows us that there are significant parallels among 
the analyses under each of the three separate frameworks discussed here. 
The factors that the courts consider and the weight that they give to those 
factors are substantially similar whether the court is determining if the 
agency’s action is reasonable at Chevron step two, if the agency’s action is 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA, or if a statutory distinction is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest in an equal protection 
analysis. These parallels are not just a recent development, but have roots in 
the origin and history of each doctrine. 
First, the Chevron reasonableness inquiry shares significant overlap with 
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review.517 In fact, the Supreme Court in 
Judulang explicitly acknowledged the analogy between Chevron 
reasonableness and arbitrary and capricious review.518 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Judulang is the first, and surprisingly the only, major 
decision in the 212(c) and 212(h) context to explicitly apply arbitrary and 
capricious review under the APA. In a footnote declining the government’s 
urging to decide the case under Chevron deference, the Court found that, 
even if they had done so, “our analysis would be the same, because under 
Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is arbitrary or 
capricious in substance.”519 At the same time, the Court in Judulang 
expanded the factors courts consider under arbitrary and capricious review 
in immigration cases.520 Rather than focusing primarily on the process by 
which the agency reached its policy interpretation, the courts now look at 
the substantive merits of that policy.521 The end result is that arbitrary and 
capricious review looks even more like the Chevron reasonableness inquiry. 
                                                                                                                 
 517. An important unresolved question is how a court should determine when to apply 
Chevron deference versus when to apply arbitrary and capricious review. See, e.g., Beerman, 
supra note 508, at 741 (“A major problem with the Chevron doctrine, going back to the 
immediate aftermath of the Chevron decision itself, has been the lack of a discernible 
boundary between cases that should be resolved using Chevron deference and cases that 
should be resolved under some other doctrine, such as the less deferential Skidmore 
deference, non-deferential statutory construction, or arbitrary or capricious review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A).”). 
 518. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011). 
 519. Id. (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 
52 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 520. Cf. Stein, supra note 511, at 48-52. 
 521. Id. 
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This correspondence did not originate in Judulang but has deep historical 
roots. The Supreme Court in Chevron used both terms appearing in the 
APA—arbitrary and capricious—to help define when an agency’s action 
was reasonable: “Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”522 
This overlap in language can be traced throughout the 212(c) and 212(h) 
cases. The Court in Judulang uses the term “reasonable” in evaluating the 
agency’s interpretation.523 Other decisions, both 212(c) and 212(h), employ 
the arbitrary and capricious language as part of their Chevron analysis. For 
example, the Fifth Circuit in Vo, in assessing the reasonableness of the 
agency’s 212(c) comparable-grounds interpretation, concluded: 
“Accordingly, Vo has not demonstrated a substantial shift in agency 
practice sufficient to render the BIA’s interpretation of its own regulation 
irrational or arbitrary and capricious.”524 The Ninth Circuit in Mtoched also 
uses the arbitrary and capricious language in describing and applying the 
Chevron reasonableness analysis to the agency’s 212(h) interpretation.525 
Even more significant than the overlap in language is the correspondence 
in the factors that the courts actually consider when engaging in the 
Chevron reasonableness analysis and arbitrary and capricious review. In 
Judulang’s arbitrary and capricious review, the Court focused on its 
conclusion 
that the BIA's approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the 
purposes of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of 
the immigration system. A method for disfavoring deportable 
aliens that bears no relation to these matters—that neither 
focuses on nor relates to an alien's fitness to remain in the 
country—is arbitrary and capricious.526  
The Supreme Court was also troubled that the Board’s comparable-grounds 
approach meant that whether or not a noncitizen was eligible for 212(c) 
relief would turn on “the fortuitous chance” of an individual officer’s 
charging decision.527 Finally, the Court also considered the consistency of 
                                                                                                                 
 522. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
 523. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55 (“The problem with the comparable-grounds policy is that 
it does not impose such a reasonable limitation.” (emphasis added)). 
 524. Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2007) 
 525. Mtoched v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 526. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55. 
 527. Id. at 58. 
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the Board’s interpretation with the statutory language, consistency of the 
Board’s position across time, and cost and efficiency considerations offered 
by the Board.528 These very same factors were at play in those 212(c) and 
212(h) cases where the courts engaged in Chevron’s step-two 
reasonableness inquiry and offered substantive discussion of the agency’s 
position529 beyond citation to prior decisions.530 
Second, both administrative law doctrines demonstrate remarkable 
similarity with equal protection rational basis review. Courts in immigration 
cases, dating back to at least the Second Circuit’s 1975 Francis decision, 
have consistently used similar formulations of the minimal scrutiny, or 
rational basis, standard: “Under the minimal scrutiny test, . . . distinctions 
between different classes of ‘persons must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and 
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”531 This formulation uses both the 
term “reasonable” from Chevron and the term “arbitrary” from arbitrary 
and capricious review.  
As previously discussed, historically arbitrary and capricious review and 
rational basis analysis have been understood to have substantial similarities. 
While the Supreme Court officially rejected any comparison between 
arbitrary and capricious review and the highly deferential rational basis test 
then used in constitutional due process analysis in 1983,532 this formulation 
and the correspondence between the two different tests nevertheless seems 
                                                                                                                 
 528. Id. at 59-64.  
 529. See, e.g., Mtoched, 786 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 2015) (considering consistency 
with the statute, the regulation, and Board precedent); Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 
1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014) (considering consistency with the statutory language); Abebe I, 
493 F.3d 1092, 1101-05 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering consistency with the statute, 
regulations, and past agency practice); Vo, 482 F.3d 363, 369-72 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(considering consistency with past agency precedent); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 
950-52 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering consistency with the statutory language); cf. Poveda v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1176-78 (11th Cir. 2012) (focusing on the equal protection 
question within the reasonableness inquiry). 
 530. For cases falling into the latter category, where the courts did not actually analyze 
the reasonableness of the agency position, see, for example, De La Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2009); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 166 (3rd Cir. 2007); 
Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 
1460-61 (11th Cir. 1994); and Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 531. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 532. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 
(1983).  
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to have stuck in the immigration context.533 Furthermore, as previously 
highlighted, courts appear to not only have considered reasonableness as 
part of the rational basis test but to have collapsed that analysis into 
Chevron step two.534 The extremely close linkages among all three of these 
legal frameworks are thus readily apparent. 
2. Significance of the Parallels 
The vast majority of the courts deciding 212(c) and 212(h) cases have 
apparently not noticed and have not commented on these parallels. The 
Supreme Court in Judulang was the first major decision to begin to make 
this connection, and it did so in only a very limited manner.535 The Court’s 
brief discussion was contained in a footnote.536 It was concerned only with 
the relationship between step two of Chevron deference and arbitrary and 
capricious review; it did not address equal protection. It recognized the 
pattern by noting that its analysis of whether the Board’s interpretation was 
reasonable under Chevron would be the same as its analysis that the 
Board’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. It did not, however, 
consider the significance or implications of this conclusion. The Court 
stated briefly that it found arbitrary and capricious review to be the 
appropriate legal framework because the Board was not interpreting a 
statute, but did not fully explore the question of choice of legal framework. 
It thus left a number of questions unanswered.  
The limitations of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Judulang and the 
failure of courts generally to note these parallels is one facet of a larger 
issue: the courts in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases have primarily engaged in 
only a surface application of the constitutional and administrative law 
principles discussed. As previously discussed, these decisions result in 
numerous outstanding issues. For example, the majority of the courts made 
no attempt to explain why they were selecting a particular legal framework 
                                                                                                                 
 533. See, e.g., Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1995); Komarenko v. INS, 35 
F.3d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 
2014); Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1176-78; De La Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1337-39; Abebe II, 554 F.3d 
1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curium); Abebe I, 493 F.3d 1092, 1104-1105 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 163, 165. But cf. Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69 n.99 
(“Although courts continue to use phrases like ′rational basis′ and ′reasoned decision-
making′ when performing arbitrary and capricious review, the actual test being applied is not 
nearly as deferential as the constitutional rational basis test.” (citations omitted)). 
 534. See, e.g., Rivas, 765 F.3d at 1330; Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1176-78; Abebe I, 493 F.3d 
at 1104-05; Vo, 482 F.3d at 369-70, 371-72; Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950. 
 535. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011). 
 536. Id. 
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or combination of frameworks. They did not address how or why Chevron 
deference, arbitrary and capricious review, and equal protection rational 
basis analysis fit together. They left open many questions specific to each 
individual doctrine. 
The theory of immigration exceptionalism has clearly eroded, as 
evidenced in the courts’ consistent and unquestioning application of 
constitutional and administrative law principles. At the same time, remnants 
of the theory still appear to be creating a certain tension in the courts’ 
decisions regarding the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h). This tension 
reveals the uneasy relationships that originated in the theory of immigration 
exceptionalism and have always existed among the courts, the executive 
branch, and Congress in the immigration context. The fact that these courts 
have not engaged in a deeper analysis of the intersection of these principles 
or attempted to answer the remaining questions regarding these doctrines 
highlighted throughout this article is a remnant of plenary power and 
immigration law exceptionalism. While administrative and constitutional 
doctrines are being applied, the explanation of what these doctrines mean 
and how they apply in the immigration law context has been stunted by this 
historical tension. 
Deeper attempts to explain what these doctrines mean, when and how 
they apply in the immigration law context, and how they interconnect will 
be the next step in the erosion of immigration exceptionalism. The Supreme 
Court took a significant step in this direction in its opinion in Judulang. The 
courts, however, appear to have moved backward again in much of their 
recent 212(h) jurisprudence. Like the initial cracks in the plenary power 
doctrine, this progress is likely to be slow, non-linear, and to proceed on its 
own timetable. 
Conclusion 
The courts’ decisions on the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h) waivers to 
the grounds of deportability are irreconcilable in both outcome and 
doctrine. It is unjustifiably inconsistent to allow 212(c) waivers to waive 
virtually all grounds of deportability, but to allow 212(h) to waive virtually 
none. Furthermore, the courts’ choices of legal framework in these cases 
among Chevron deference, arbitrary and capricious review, and equal 
protection are incoherent. Even within a single doctrine, there is no 
uniformity in interpretation and application. By looking at the factors that 
the courts have considered in these cases, however, it is possible to identify 
significant parallels. What the courts are actually doing in assessing 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable at step two of Chevron 
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looks very much like what they are doing in assessing whether an agency’s 
position is arbitrary and capricious under the APA, which in turn looks very 
much like what they are doing in assessing whether there is a rational basis 
for a distinction under equal protection review. 
The fact that the courts are regularly applying these ordinary principles 
of administrative and constitutional law in the immigration context at all 
illustrates a continuing erosion of the plenary power doctrine and the theory 
of immigration exceptionalism. However, immigration exceptionalism has 
nevertheless had a lasting impact on the cases. The courts’ failure to 
identify and analyze the parallels noted above and to engage in a deep 
analysis of the constitutional and administrative law principles being 
applied generally is a remnant of plenary power and immigration 
exceptionalism. This is likely to be the next facet of immigration 
exceptionalism to crumble, bringing immigration law ever so slowly closer 
to mainstream legal doctrine. So doing may help the courts focus on the 
underlying purpose for their analysis and avoid getting caught up in the 
minutiae and technicalities of the doctrine. This much-needed paradigm 
shift will build consistency and coherence and will reduce legal errors in 
immigration jurisprudence. 
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